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In recent years some labor unions have engaged in increasingly ag-
gressive campaigns. The so-called "corporate campaign," which pres-
sures employers to accede to the union's demands for more favorable
working conditions, entails innovative tactics that unions direct against
employers, the employers' shareholders, the employers' business associ-
ates, government agencies, as well as the consuming public. Using an
actual corporate campaign as a prototype, Professor Fletcher examines
federal labor and antitrust statutes in their statutory and historical con-
text, and points out labor and antitrust law violations that occur during
a typical corporate campaign. He also argues that aggressive corporate
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campaign tactics in toto may violate state tort laws. Finally, he con-
cludes that, while some aspects of the corporate campaign receive consti-
tutional or statutory protection, the more aggressive aspects violate the
spirit and the letter of labor, antitrust, and state tort laws.
I. INTRODUCTION
The American labor union movement recently has entered a period of diffi-
cult times. Union membership has declined in the United States,' and many
industries that historically have employed union labor are suffering economi-
cally.2 The severity of the labor movement's plight has generated considerable
publicity as unions continue to make wage and benefit concessions to manage-
ment.3 Furthermore, in many instances traditional union tactics such as picket-
ing and striking have failed to have any noticeable effect on the willingness of
management to compromise.
4
Although unsuccessful strikes are not a new phenomenon, 5 more recent
failures have occurred in an increasingly hostile climate. Union supporters are
worried, and for good reason. Nevertheless, along with the wringing of hands,
labor unions have exhibited a creative energy and a willingness to become more
aggressive in dealing with recalcitrant employers.
The most recent manifestation of increased labor aggressiveness is the
"corporate campaign,"' 6 a centrally coordinated, broad-stroke assault on the em-
ployer.7 Although the corporate campaign iivolves few new tactics, its use has
broadened the scope of labor disputes considerably. By launching a corporate
campaign against a company that refuses to accede to its demands, a labor union
attempts to "bust the company." 8 The corporate campaign idea has even
spawned an entrepreneurial enterprise, "Corporate Campaign, Incorporated,"
which offers to coordinate labor campaigns against targeted employers. 9
1. Both union density-union membership as a percentage of the total nonagricultural work
force-and union membership in real numbers have declined in recent years. See Murphy, Labor
Pains, 34 POL'Y REV. 76, 78-79 (1985); Weiler, Promises to Keep: Serving Workers' Rights to Self-
Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1771-72 (1983).
2. The steel and wood products industries have experienced a particularly sharp economic
downturn. See Steel Bargaining: The Last Chance, Bus. WK., Jan. 17, 1983, at 94.
3. See, e.g., Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 1982, at H9, col. 1. A good example in the recent past is the
heavily publicized Chrysler concessions made by the United Auto Workers. See N.Y. Times, Oct.
26, 1979, at Al, col. 4. Weakness in the wood products industry continues to require management
to seek wage and benefit rollbacks. See Oregonian, Apr. 23, 1986, at C12, col. 1.
4. See, e.g., Oregonian, Mar. 17, 1986, at D9, col. 5; Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 1985, at 1, col. 6;
Oregonian, June 25, 1984, at D9, col. 1; San Jose Mercury News, Feb. 19, 1984 (West magazine), at
1.
5. One of the most famous union debacles in British history was the failed general strike of
1926, which did much to propel Winston Churchill's political career. See W. MANCHESTER, THE
LAST LION: WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL 794-804 (1983).
6. Although its origin is unclear, this phrase dates back at least to 1981. See Wall St. J., Mar.
1, 1985, at 38, col. 1.
7. See Daily J. Com., Mar. 12, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
8. See Wall St. J., June 26, 1984, at 27, col. 2 (union official involved in corporate campaign
quoted as saying "[w]e're going to bust this company").
9. See Wall St. J., March 1, 1985, at 38, col. I. This New York corporation has conducted at
least six corporate campaigns on behalf of unions. See id.; see also The Picket Line Gives Way to
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Unions have undertaken one of the most widely publicized corporate cam-
paigns against Louisiana-Pacific Corporation, a diversified wood products man-
ufacturer. Beginning in 198410 the Western Council of Lumber, Production and
Industrial Workers of America (Western Council) and the United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners of America (UBC)I' launched a multifaceted assault
against Louisiana-Pacific Corporation. Although the campaign against Louisi-
ana-Pacific ultimately failed, it illustrates the potential breadth of the corporate
campaign and demonstrates the creativity that unions can display.
This Article, using the campaign against Louisiana-Pacific as an archetype,
examines the corporate campaign from a legal perspective. 12 Part II describes
the corporate campaign that the UBC and Western Council conducted against
Louisiana-Pacific. Part III analyzes the vulnerability of that particular cam-
paign to claims of unfair labor practices under section 8(b)(4) of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).13 Part IV addresses antitrust aspects of such
campaign activities under the Sherman 14 and Clayton Acts.15 Finally, Part V
examines state tort law implications for labor unions that engage in corporate
campaigns. This Article concludes that, although the unions involved in corpo-
rate campaigns purposely circumscribe their conduct in an attempt to fit within
existing legal parameters, any such corporate campaign represents a transgres-
sion of both the letter and spirit of labor, antitrust, and state tort law. However,
this Article also concludes that some of the potentially most effective aspects of
the corporate campaign are lawful and even protected as a matter of constitu-
tional law.
II. THE CORPORATE CAMPAIGN
When the UBC and Western Council began striking Louisiana-Pacific, they
called for a national consumer boycott of all Louisiana-Pacific products, includ-
ing Louisiana-Pacific's most promising new product, Waferwood, a brand of
Sophisticated New Tactics, Bus. WK., Apr. 16, 1984, at 116 (describing other campaigns conducted
by Corporate Campaign, Inc.). The head of Corporate Campaign, Inc., Ray Rogers, served as the
chief strategist for Local P-9 of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union's bloody strike
against Geo. A. Hormel & Co. See Oregonian, Apr. 12, 1986, at Cl, col. 6. Rogers was arrested
and charged with felony riot after strikers injured nine policemen with rocks and mace in Austin,
Minnesota. Id.
10. Because union pressures against Louisiana-Pacific increased steadily over a period of
months, it is difficult to pinpoint the beginning of the corporate campaign. On March 2, 1984,
however, the Western Council's newspaper officially announced the beginning of the corporate cam-
paign. See Union Reg., March 2, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
11. The Western Council and UBC are not formally affiliated. Unlike the Western Council, the
UBC is affiliated with the AFL-CIO. Nevertheless, they share a certain amount of common mem-
bership, and they have joined together to fight Louisiana-Pacific. Although the UBC has taken the
lead in corporate campaign activities, this Article treats the two unions as if they were one.
12. For descriptions of other corporate campaigns, see A Final Onslaught at Phelps Dodge, Bus.
WK., Sept. 24, 1984, at 44; The Picket Line Gives Way to Sophisticated New Tactics, Bus. WK., April
16, 1984, at 116.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-17, 44 (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982).
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compressed wood board designed as a substitute for plywood. 16 This widely
promoted "product boycott" involved, among other activities, picketing and
leafleting retail distributors of Louisiana-Pacific products; the leaflets asked that
consumers not purchase Louisiana-Pacific products at those particular retail
establishments. 17
The product boycott ultimately failed, 18 however, and traditional union
tactics such as striking and picketing also failed to produce concessions on the
part of Louisiana-Pacific. To increase pressures on the company, the UBC and
Western Council broadened the scope of their efforts, and in early 1984
launched the real corporate campaign. 19
The first step in the campaign involved the expansion of the product boy-
cott into a "don't patronize" boycott. This intensified boycott had five key com-
ponents. First, the unions leafleted retailers that sold Louisiana-Pacific products
and asked customers not to patronize those stores.20 Second, the unions wrote
letters to certain retailers and threatened them with boycott activities if they
continued to carry Louisiana-Pacific products.2 1 Third, the unions issued news
releases and threatened to conduct boycotts of any retailers carrying Louisiana-
Pacific products.2 2 Fourth, they used radio and newspaper advertisements in an
effort to persuade consumers not to patronize certain named retailers carrying
16. Louisiana-Pacific produces plywood, lumber, and wood pulp.
17. See Union Reg., Mar. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 1; see also Union Reg., June 21, 1985, at 1, col. 2
(picket reading, "If You Shop Here, Please Do Not Buy Unfair Louisiana-Pacific Wood Products").
At the request of the UBC, the AFL-CIO Executive Council in December 1983 called for a nation-
wide boycott of all Louisiana-Pacific wood products. See UNITED BHD. OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS
OF AM., THE FIGHT GOES ON: LOUISIANA-PACIFIC STRIKE ANNUAL REPORT, at 4 (n.d.) [herein-
after ANNUAL REPORT].
18. A union newspaper called for tactics more aggressive than those a product boycott would
entail. See Union Reg., May 3, 1985, at 6, col. 2.
19. See Union Reg., Mar. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
20. See Union Reg., Mar. 15, 1985, at I, col. 3; Nat'l Home Center News, Dec. 17, 1984, at 7,
col. 1; United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., News Release (Oct. 23, 1984).
21, A letter to one retailer from UBC General President, Patrick J. Campbell, read in part:
Based on information we have received; we have determined that Louisiana-Pacific
products are sold at your store, and we plan to commence lawful, noncoercive boycott
activities at your store and a number of other stores where Louisiana-Pacific products are
sold. We intend to engage in lawful non-picketing publicity, including consumer leafleting
to ask the public not to patronize your store. In conjunction with the consumer leafleting,
newspaper and radio advertisements will be utilized. I have enclosed a copy of our news-
paper advertisement as it appeared in the Minneapolis Star and Tribune initiating "don't
patronize" activity in that area.
If, in fact, you do not distribute any Louisiana-Pacific products, please let us know as
soon as possible.
Letter from Patrick J. Campbell to Yeager & Kirk (Dec. 5, 1984); see also Letter from Campbell to
Richard Argin (Mar. 5, 1985) (threatening boycott of retailer). The union sent similar letters to an
estimated 400 retailers. See Nat'l Home Center News, Dec. 17, 1984, at 7, col. I.
22. A press release dated November 15, 1984, read in part:
The UBC confirmed through routine checks that at least three retailers, Menards, Lampert
Building Centers, and Knox Lumber Co., located in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, are
distributing L-P products. Handbilling activities will commence on November 10.
The "Don't Patronize" effort includes intensified handbilling activity, newspaper ads,
and radio spots naming the specific retailers selling L-P products. In addition to the three
retailers targeted for initial activity, other chains retailing L-P wood products will be iden-
tified by staff checks in the coming weeks in different areas of the country.
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Louisiana-Pacific products.23 Before airing those advertisements, the unions
made explicit public threats that the advertisements would be aired if the retail-
ers did not cease doing business with Louisiana-Pacific. 24 Last, the boycott in-
cluded an "adopt-a-lumber-store" campaign, in which union locals were
encouraged to target local retailers of Louisiana-Pacific products and to dissuade
those retailers, through boycott activities, from carrying Louisiana-Pacific prod-
ucts. The unions sent interested locals boycott literature, leaflets, instructions,
and camera-ready advertisements for local newspapers. 25
The unions particularly aimed their "don't patronize" boycott at retailers
carrying Waferwood, which the unions identified as a key target product.26 Fur-
thermore, the UBC's head office in Washington, D.C. 27 carefully orchestrated
all boycott activities in an attempt to fit them within the ambit of what they
perceived to be protected activity28 under the NLRA.29 However, the corporate
campaign did not end with boycott activities.
The unions also engaged in the following activities in 1984 and 1985:
(1) they opposed Louisiana-Pacific's application for Urban Development Ac-
tion Grants,30 claiming that the company made misrepresentations in its
application;
3 1
(2) they brought numerous environmental challenges to Louisiana-Pacific
activities,32 particularly in cases of proposed expansion of Louisiana-Pacific
Waferwood production.33 Those environmental challenges involved a coopera-
tive effort with local and national environmental and citizen groups; 3 4
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., News Release (Nov. 15, 1984).
That release contained what appears to be a thinly veiled threat directed at the three named
retailers.
23. See Union Reg., May 3, 1985, at 6, col. 3.
24. See Nat'l Home Center News, Dec. 17, 1984, at 7, col. 1.
25. See Union Reg., Apr. 19, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
26. See CARPENTER, June 1985, at 8; Union Reg., May 3, 1985, at 6, col. 3.
27. The UBC produced nearly all the boycott literature. Its General President, Patrick J.
Campbell, took an active role, and press releases regarding the boycott show that they emanated
from UBC headquarters in Washington, D.C.
28. When the UBC initiated its leafleting campaign, it distributed instructions that admonished
union members (1) to be peaceful; (2) not to block entrances; (3) to leaflet only consumer as opposed
to employee entrances; (4) not to picket while conducting "don't patronize" leafleting; (5) not to
interfere with employees or pick up and deliveries; (6) to keep the area clean and be courteous; and
(7) not to use intoxicating beverages while leafletting. UNITED BHD. OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS OF
AM., LEAFLETTER INSTRUCTIONS FOR "DON'T PATRONIZE" CAMPAIGN (n.d.). The union sent
copies of the instructions to retailers that carried Louisiana-Pacific products with threats to conduct
boycott activities at the retailers' establishments.
29. Also known as the Wagner Act, the NLRA is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
30. Congress authorized Urban Development Action Grants in 1974 as part of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (1982)). The grants are made, upon application, by the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development. See 36 C.F.R. § 801 (1985). Their stated purpose is "to promote...
the development of viable urban communities." 42 U.S.C. § 5318(a) (1982).
31. See Union Reg., May 3, 1985, at 7, col. 4.
32. See, e.g., Campbell, Two Vital Issues. The L-P Boycott and the Proposals to Tax Life-Sup-
port, CARPENTER, Apr. 1985, at 40; L-P Strikers at Shareholders Meeting, CARPENTER, June 1985,
at 9; Nat'l Home Center News, Dec. 17, 1984, at 127, col. 2.
33. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 5-6; Union Reg., May 3, 1985, at 6, col. 3.
34. Correspondence from the Sierra Club to state and national environmental agencies indi-
1986]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
(3) they wrote letters to the governors of states where Louisiana-Pacific was
interested in expanding its presence. Those letters ostensibly were designed to
"inform" the governors of safety problems at Louisiana-Pacific plants;35
(4) they opposed Louisiana-Pacific purchases of federal timber;
36
(5) they wrote letters to Louisiana-Pacific creditors to "inform" them of the
strike and its effects on Louisiana-Pacific's profitability;
3 7
(6) they wrote letters to stock analysts to "inform" them of the strike and its
effects on Louisiana-Pacific's profitability. 38 Later these letters became more
threatening in both tone and substance;
39
(7) they leafleted the Davis Cup international tennis matches sponsored by
Louisiana-Pacific with union propaganda about the strike. The leaflets did not
expressly encourage a boycott of the tennis matches;4°
(8) they encouraged and supported local citizen opposition to the construction
of a Waferwood plant in Virginia; 41
(9) they publicized the names of Louisiana-Pacific competitors. The competi-
tors employed union labor, and their products could be substituted for Louisi-
cates that copies were sent to UBC officials. See, eg., Letter from Judith Kunofsky to Fred Lief
(May 9, 1984). Similarly, copies of letters from the Sierra Club to Louisiana-Pacific executives were
sent to UBC officials. See Letter from Judith Kunofsky to Harry Merlo (May 9, 1984). In May
1985 the Western Council's newspaper reported:
During the course of the dispute, UBC members and affiliates have found numerous
religious, civic and environmental groups interested in the labor dispute with L-P. The
extensive research done by the UBC has helped facilitate the actions of varied organiza-
tions concerned with aspects of L-P operations. The common concerns of these organiza-
tions will help intensify the scrutiny on L-P with regard to a wide range of issues.
Union Reg., May 3, 1985, at 12, col. 1; see also Campbell, supra note 32, at 40 ("We've worked
closely with religious and community groups to broaden our base of support against L-P.").
35. See Address by Patrick J. Campbell, UBC General President, UBC rally on Wall Street
(Mar. 22, 1984).
36. See Union Reg., May 3, 1985, at 7, col. 5.
37. See Letter from Patrick J. Campbell to Willard C. Butcher (Chase Manhattan Bank) (Feb-
ruary 14, 1984). The letter read in part:
I am taking this opportunity to inform you of the increasing seriousness of this dispute
[with Louisiana-Pacific]. The United Brotherhood of Carpenters and the AFL-CIO have
initiated a national consumer boycott of the Louisiana-Pacific wood products. Such an
action against a wood products producer is unprecedented in the history of this organiza-
tion, and it signals our total commitment to pursue actions which will aid in the just resolu-
tion of the dispute.
38. See Union Reg., Mar. 2, 1984, at 2. One such letter contained unfavorable press clippings
concerning Louisiana-Pacific's attempts to expand its waferboard operations. See Letter from Ed-
ward J. Durkin to "Louisiana-Pacific Waferboard Analyst" (June 7, 1985).
39. See Letter from Patrick J. Campbell to William A. Schreyer (Merrill Lynch) (n.d.), repro-
duced in Louisiana-Pacific Keep the Pressure On, CARPENTER, Oct. 1985, at 14 ("I represent work-
ers whose retirement funds and welfare funds hold considerable amounts of Merrill Lynch, Inc.
stock and who utilize Merrill Lynch Asset Management investment services.").
40. The UBC prepared its own "program" with match information accompanied by union
propaganda. In addition, the union passed out flyers that chronicled alleged Louisiana-Pacific trans-
gressions. Included was the statement, "Enjoy the matches, but please don't be fooled by the public
image L-P is trying to foster with its sponsorship of the Davis Cup." UNITED BHD. OF
CARPENTERS & JOINERS OF AM., DOUBLE FAULT (n.d.); see also Oregonian, Sept. 30, 1984, at D12,
col. 1 (reporting protest at match).
41. The UBC supported local citizen opposition to a new Louisiana-Pacific Waferwood plant in




(10) they organized a group of union members who owned small amounts of
Louisiana-Pacific stock into a "Louisiana-Pacific Workers for Justice Commit-
tee." The committee conducted proxy fights in both 1984 and 1985 in an at-
tempt to pass resolutions that would embarrass Louisiana-Pacific's
management.43 During both years the union was present at Louisiana-Pacifie's
annual meeting to conduct demonstrations, make speeches, and ask questions
apparently designed to embarrass Louisiana-Pacific management;
4"
(11) they threatened State Farm Insurance Group, a large Louisiana-Pacific
stockholder,45 with a boycott of State Farm policies if State Farm did not vote
with the union in the proxy fight.46 At the 1985 annual meeting, State Farm
voted with the union on one of the union's three proxy resolutions;47
(12) they threatened in public speeches to divest pension monies from compa-
nies holding Louisiana-Pacific stock;
48
(13) they leafleted Louisiana-Pacific's headquarters in Portland, Oregon, with
flyers that accused Louisiana-Pacific of rigged timber bids, environmental pollu-
tion, racist employment policies, market manipulation, falsified records, and
fraud.49 Those accusations were repeated in union newspapers and in a letter to
Portland mayor Frank Ivancie and other Portland city officials; 50 and
42. See Blandex A Union-Label Alternative to the Boycotted L-P Waferboard, CARPENTER,
Mar. 1985, at 10. A flyer distributed by the UBC read in part:
You don't need to buy L-P. There are plenty of quality wood products on the market.
Otherfair manufacturers make products comparable to those of unfair Louisiana-Pacific.
Here are a few of the hundreds of fair, resppnsible companies selling wood products at
the same price as L-P-or in some cases even lower: [lists 11 Louisiana-Pacific
competitors].
UNITED BHD. OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS OF AM., DON'T BUY L-P WOOD PRODUCTS (n.d.).
43. See Union Reg., May 3, 1985, at 7, col. 5. The "Workers for Justice Committee" and the
UBC share a common mailing address in Washington, D.C.
44. See L-P Strikers at Shareholders Meeting, CARPENTER, June 1985, at 9. A flyer distributed
before the 1984 annual meeting, entitled "Reckoning at Rocky Mount," detailed the committee's
plans to disrupt the annual meeting. See Union Reg., May 18, 1984, at 1, col. I ("L-P shareholders
take Merlo to task!").
45. State Farm at the time owned 2.4 million shares, approximately 75% of Louisiana-Pacific
stock. Union Reg., May 3, 1985, at 1, col 1.
46. See id. ("The [UBC] maintains a computer file of all union pension fund investments.
These investments are increasingly dependent on the labor relations philosophies and practices of
those companies in which the funds are invested.").
47. Id.
48. On March 22, 1984, UBC General President Patrick J. Campbell spoke to a small group of
assembled union members on Wall Street in New York City:
Union pension funds, the lifeblood of this financial center, will be informed of our
dispute with L-P. Union pension assets must not support L-P's union busting operations.
Those banks, insurance companies and investment advisors who inhabit these streets and
manage workers' retirement funds should take notice of our dispute with L-P.
Address by Patrick J. Campbell, UBC General President, UBC rally on Wall Street (Mar. 22, 1984).
49. One such flyer asked the rhetorical question: "Aside from union busting, has Louisiana-
Pacific Corporation engaged in any other improprieties?" and then answered: "Yes. Among them
are rigged timber bids, environmental pollution, racist employment policies, market manipulation,
falsified recordkeeping and fraud." UNITED BHD. OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS OF AM., WHAT'S
THE LABOR PROBLEM? (n.d.).
50. See Letter from Bradley K. Witt to Frank Ivancie (August 15, 1984). That letter read in
part: "It is incomprehensible that the Mayor of Portland could laud a CEO whose corporation's
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
(14) they cooperated with a union-shop competitor of Louisiana-Pacific, Blan-
din Wood Products Company of Grand Rapids, Michigan, in an attempt to put
economic pressure on Louisiana-Pacific. Blandin produces Blandex, a
Waferwood type product. Blandin produces approximately 190 million square
feet of Blandex per year-all produced by a UBC local. Blandin officials met
with UBC members in 1985 and gave the UBC reporter and photographer ac-
cess to the Blandex plant. In exchange the UBC ran a multipage article in its
monthly magazine extolling the virtues of Blandex and reporting it to be a supe-
rior alternative to Waferwood.
51
Despite the intensified efforts of the UBC and Western Council, their suc-
cess is difficult to measure. Louisiana-Pacific never compromised in its bargain-
ing position. Rather, the company reacted by backing decertification elections
at all the struck plants.5 2 As a result, the union has lost the right to represent
employees at many of the plants.5 3 The unions have claimed that as many as
400 retailers no longer carry Louisiana-Pacific products as a result of union pres-
sures.5 4 Louisiana-Pacific stated in late 1984 that the total monetary cost of the
strike and corporate campaign had been approximately four million dollars.55
The unions have claimed a much higher figure.
56
Although the economic effect of the UBC and Western Council corporate
campaign may be in question, there can be no doubt about the purpose of
the effort. This "Main Street to Wall Street" campaign, as one union official
described it,57 was designed to put economic pressure on Louisiana-Pacific by
costing the company money.58 Due to the breadth of its scope and the ambi-
tiousness of its goals, the corporate campaign against Louisiana-Pacific serves as
an archetype for future labor campaigns. Furthermore, the campaign raises an
important question-namely, whether a union can legally engage in such activi-
modus operandi includes [sic] fraud, market manipulation, environmental abuse, racist hiring poli-
cies, falsification of records, bilking public timber and attempted union-busting." Copies of the letter
were sent to all Portland city council members and the mayor-elect.
51. Blandex: A Union-Label Alternative to the Boycotted L-P Waferboard, CARPENTER, Mar.
1985, at 10-11, 24.
52. At the time ofthis writing, the strike had not ended. Under the NLRA a union may lose its
right to represent a body of workers if the workers vote to "decertify" the union. 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)
(1982).
53. The union lost decertification elections in many of the struck plants. See, eg., Daily J. of
Com., July 18, 1984, at 1, col. 3; Wall St. J., June 26, 1984, at 27, col. 1; Oregonian, June 23, 1984, at
El, col. 8.
54. See CARPENTER, July 1985, at 12. The UBC has claimed that the boycott has been success-
ful because of the financial pressures the union has brought to bear on retailers. Union Reg., Apr. 5,
1985, at I, col. 3-4 ("The 'Don't Patronize' aspect of the boycott is now beginning to cost retailers
handling L-P products... with the result that increased response is now being generated in the form
of lost L-P sales.").
55. See Nat'l Home Center News, Dec. 17, 1984, at 127, col. 2.
56. Id.
57. UBC General President Patrick J. Campbell coined this phrase. Address by Patrick J.
Campbell, UBC General President, UBC rally on Wall Street (Mar. 22, 1984). The phrase was
repeated in later union publications. See, eg., Union Reg., May 3, 1985, at 6, col. 3.
58. See Union Reg., Apr. 5, 1985, at 1, col. 1. UBC General President Patrick J. Campbell
stated that he was in no hurry to settle immediately: "I'd like to get a few more months of mileage
out of this boycott campaign." Id. Another union official admitted that "[flrom the beginning our
goal has been to cost L-P money." Id. at 1, col. 3.
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ties? The answer for the most part is in the negative under a proper interpreta-
tion of the relevant statutes and common law.
59
III. CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
A. The Legislative Framework
In analyzing the legal implications of the corporate campaign, the most
obvious place to begin is with the legislative framework of the NLRA. Section 8
of the NLRA6 ° describes the actions that constitute unfair labor practices by
employers and labor unions. Section 8(b) declares certain union activities unfair
labor practices.61 Subsection 8(b)(4)(ii) outlaws, among other activities, a
union's exertion of secondary pressures 62 on persons who do business with the
primary employer. That subsection declares it to be an unfair labor practice for
a labor organization or its agents
to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in
an industry affecting commerce, where ... an object thereof is-
(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self employed person.., to
enter into any agreement which is prohibited by subsection (e) of this
section; [or]
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other pro-
ducer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any
other person .... 63
Subsection 8(b)(4) also contains the following "publicity proviso:"
64
Provided... [tihat for the purposes of this paragraph... only, nothing
contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity,
other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public
59. Notwithstanding the expansive breadth of a typical corporate campaign, this Article fo-
cuses primarily on those aspects of the campaign that either constitute unlawful activity under appli-
cable law or that enjoy constitutional protection. Those activities that are legally neutral are not
discussed at length.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
61. Section 8(a) defines unfair labor practices for employers; § 8(b) defines unfair labor prac-
tices for unions; and §§ 8(e)-(f) apply to both unions and employers. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)-(f) (1982).
62. The difference between primary and secondary activity was cogently and concisely de-
scribed by Professor Cox as follows:
Historically, a boycott is a refusal to have dealings with an offending person. To induce
customers not to buy from an offending grocery store is to organize a primary boycott. To
persuade grocery stores not to buy [a particular brand of] products is also a primary boy-
cott. In each case the only economic pressure is levelled at the offending person-in terms
of labor cases, at the employer involved in the labor dispute.
The element of 'secondary activity' is introduced when there is a refusal to have deal-
ings with one who has dealings with the offending person .... Thus, there are two employ-
ers in every secondary boycott resulting from a labor dispute.
Cox, The Landrum-Griffn Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REv. 257,
271 (1959).
63. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii) (1982). Congress enacted § 8(b)(4)(ii) in 1947. Labor Relations
Management Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 141-42 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1982)).
64. This phrase was coined by the National Labor Relations Board and first used by the federal
judiciary in 1962. See McLeod v. Business Mach. & Office Appliance Mechanics Conference Bd.,
300 F.2d 237, 239 (2d Cir. 1962).
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* . . that a product or products are produced by an employer with
whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed
by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect
of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the pri-
mary employer . . . to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any
goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the em-
ployer engaged in such distribution.
65
Section 8(e), referred to in section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) above, provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any
employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied,
whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain
from.., selling.., or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any
other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person
66
The publicity proviso by its terms does not apply to section 8(e).
67
Sections 8(b)(4)(ii) and 8(e) enjoy an intimate relationship in secondary
boycott law. By its terms section 8(b)(4)(ii) prohibits certain secondary boycott
activities, 68 and by its terms section 8(e) outlaws the fruits of a successful "don't
patronize" boycott-the agreement by the secondary employer to suspend busi-
ness relations with the targeted primary employer in exchange for an end to the
boycott activities. 6
9
B. Secondary Boycott Activities Under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)
1. Product Boycotts and Total Boycotts
An essential distinction in this area exists among three types of secondary
boycott activities: The product boycott at the secondary level, the total secon-
dary boycott with picketing, and the total secondary boycott without picketing.
Courts have held the first type of boycott to be legal; the second type is clearly
illegal; and the third type clearly should be illegal under the NLRA's
proscriptions.
Initially, the unions' secondary activity in the campaign against Louisiana-
Pacific took the form of a product boycott.70 In such an action the union calls
for a consumer boycott of all items produced by the primary employer. The
union typically asks consumers not to purchase the primary employer's goods
65. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).
66. Id. § 158(e).
67. Sections 8(b)(4) and 8(e) in their present forms are both products of the Landrum-Griffin
amendments to the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257,
73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 8(b)(4), (e) (1982)). For a thorough analysis of the
Landrum-Griffin amendments, see Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, 73 HARV. L. REv. 851, 1086 (1960).
68. As discussed infra text accompanying notes 70-145, the degree to which § 8(b)(4)(ii) pro-
hibits secondary boycott activities is a complicated matter, hotly disputed, and of great consequence
to the corporate campaign.
69. See infra text accompanying note 151 (discussing the "implied agreement").




from a neutral secondary employer, such as a retailer or distributor. Often,
union members picket a retailer with signs that read "Please Don't Buy X Brand
Product At This Store."
7 1
The total boycott carries the product boycott one step further. In a total
secondary boycott, the union asks consumers not to buy any of the secondary
employer's products because the secondary employer does business with the
"unfair" primary employer. A crucial distinction exists between two types of
total secondary boycotts: Those that involve picketing of the secondary em-
ployer and those that do not involve such picketing. Typically, if the union does
not picket the secondary employer, it distributes leaflets or handbills. In either
case, a typical total secondary boycott picket or leaflet would read "Please Don't
Patronize This Store-It Buys From An Unfair Employer."
In 1964 the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable
Packers (Tree Fruits)72 held that the secondary product boycott is not an unfair
labor practice under section 8(b)(4)(ii) of the NLRA. 73 In 1980, however, the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees74 held that picketing a sec-
ondary employer and calling for a total boycott of that secondary employer's
business violates section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 75 The Supreme Court has discussed
76
but never decided the question raised by the secondary activities involved in the
71. In the case of Louisiana-Pacific, union members typically carried pickets that read: "Please
don't buy unfair Louisiana-Pacific Corp. wood products. We have no dispute with this store." See
id. at 1, col. 1-2.
72. 377 U.S. 58 (1964). The name "Tree Fruits" refers to the employer organization involved
in that case, the Tree Fruits Labor Relations Committee, Inc. See id. at 59 n.2.
73. Id. at 71-72.
74. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
75. Id. at 611. In Retail Store Employees the union had called for a secondary product boycott
that had the predictable effect of inducing consumers to boycott totally the secondary employer's
goods. The Court found this effect to be an evil, because the effect inevitably induces secondary
employers to cease business relations with the primary employer and impermissibly expands the
labor dispute. Expansion of the labor dispute is one of the evils intended to be countered by
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA. Id. at 613-14. The Court reasoned that the product boycott, on the
other hand, has the effect of inducing the secondary employer to drop only the struck product as a
poor seller. Id. at 613.
The reasoning of the Court in Retail Store Employees is unclear. The total secondary boycott is
an evil precisely because of the way it expands a labor dispute. The product boycott has the same
purpose and effect-coercing the secondary employer to cease or curtail business relations with the
primary employer. The distinction between product boycotts and total boycotts is therefore difficult
to justify, as is the holding of Tree Fruits.
76. See, eg., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 463 U.S. 147, 153-56 (1982); Tree Fruits,
377 U.S. at 63-64. In Tree Fruits, the Court seemed to condemn all total secondary boycott
activities:
In the [product boycott] case, the union's appeal to the public is confined to its dispute with
the primary employer, since the public is not asked to withhold its patronage from the
secondary employer, but only to boycott the primary employer's goods. On the other
hand, a union appeal to the public at the secondary site not to trade at all with the secon-
dary employer goes beyond the goods of the primary employer, and seeks the public's
assistance in forcing the secondary employer to cooperate with the union in its primary
dispute.
Id. Thus, the Court announced that § 8(b)(4)(ii) of the NLRA prohibits total secondary boycott
activities, unless of course those activities are protected by the publicity proviso. As discussed be-
low, however, the proscriptive provisions of § 8(b)(4)(ii) and the publicity proviso are mutually ex-
clusive. That which the Court condemned in the above passage from Tree Fruits can never be
protected by the publicity proviso. See infra text accompanying notes 126-145.
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corporate campaign: May a labor union lawfully leaflet, rather than picket, a
secondary employer and call for a total boycott of that secondary employer's
business in an attempt to induce that secondary employer to cease doing busi-
ness with the primary employer? The answer, under a proper reading of the
NLRA, is no.
2. The NLRB on Total Secondary Boycotts
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), however, has consistently
espoused a position at variance with both the judicial case law and the statute
itself on the question of secondary boycotts. The NLRB provides an alternative
forum for victims of unfair labor practices who elect not to bring suit in federal
court. 77 Since Congress inserted the publicity proviso into section 8(b)(4) in
1959,78 the NLRB often has asserted that the publicity proviso protects the total
secondary boycott so long as the boycott does not involve picketing.
79 Most
recently, the NLRB's Regional Director in New York found that a total secon-
dary boycott of a Louisiana-Pacific retailer in Connecticut by the UBC did not
constitute an unfair labor practice. 80
Not only does the NLRB position contradict the judicial case law, 81 but
one hand of the NLRB does not seem to know what the other hand is doing.
While the NLRB sitting as a board has consistently rejected unfair labor prac-
tice claims for total secondary boycott activities that do not involve picketing,
the enforcement arm of the NLRB has obtained injunctions in federal court
against these same types of activities. 82 In fact, in at least one case this inconsis-
tency has tripped up the NLRB. In McLeod v. Business Machine & Office Appli-
ance Mechanics Conference Board, Local 459 83 the NLRB sought to enjoin total
secondary boycott activities that did not involve picketing. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the injunction request, not be-
cause the court found such activity to be outside the prohibition of section
77. The NLRA authorizes a private right of action in federal court for violations of § 8(b)(4).
See 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982). The victim of an unfair labor practice may instead decide to file a
complaint with the NLRB regional director. After the complaint is filed, the regional director inves-
tigates the charge. If the director finds merit in the charge, he or she may obtain an injunction
pendente lite on a showing of reasonable cause. The full board will then hear the case and may issue
an order to stop the practice and to have the employer reinstate aggrieved employees if necessary.
See id. §§ 153(d), 160.
78. The Landrum-Griffin Amendments, which include the publicity proviso, were enacted as
part of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat.
519 (1960) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. (1982)).
79. See Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. Trades Council, 252 N.L.R.B. 702 (1980), petition denied sub
noin. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 662 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated, 463 U.S. 147
(1983); Local 54, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 174 N.L.R.B. 362 (1969).
80. See NLRB Letter Ruling, Case No. 2-CC-1861 (March 4, 1985). An NLRB Associate
General Counsel reached an identical conclusion concerning a UBC boycott of an Oregon retailer of
Louisiana-Pacific products. See Oregon State District Council of Carpenters (Fred Meyer, Inc.),
120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1347 (Sept. 30, 1985) (Advice Memorandum).
81. See infra text accompanying notes 86-98.
82, See, e.g., NLRB v. National Ass'n of Broadcast Employees, 631 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Solien v. United Steelworkers of Am., 593 F.2d 82 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828 (1979);
Potter v. United Plant Guard Workers, 192 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
83. 300 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1962).
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8(b)(4), but because the NLRB had taken a position contrary to its holdings in
quasi-judicial settings.84 Under the circumstances, the court refused to find rea-
sonable cause for an unfair labor practice claim.35
3. The Courts on Total Secondary Boycotts
Unlike the NLRB, the federal courts never have looked favorably on secon-
dary pressures in the labor context.8 6 In addition, they have recognized that the
primary purpose of the new and improved version of section 8(b)(4) "is to pro-
tect neutral employers, i.e. those not directly involved in a labor dispute, from
direct union sanctions."' 87 The courts' antipathy toward secondary pressures
rests on well-founded statutory88 and policy grounds: the resolution of a labor
dispute is facilitated when the scope of that dispute does not extend beyond the
union and the primary employer, between whom settlement "negotiations...
should properly take place."
'89
The federal courts quite properly have been willing to translate that antipa-
thy into concrete disapproval of total secondary boycotts that involve handbil-
ling activities. 90 In NLRB v. National Association of Broadcast Employees,9 1 for
example, a union had struck against its primary employer, the American Broad-
casting Company television and radio network, which was covering news events
at various Washington, D.C. hotels. The union appeared at one of the hotels
and passed out handbills that asked customers not to patronize that hotel, the
84. See id. at 239, 241-42.
85. Id. at 237. The court based its application of the "reasonable cause" standard on § 10(l) of
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1982), which authorizes the NLRB to seek appropriate injunctive
relief whenever, after investigation, the board or its regional director finds reasonable cause to believe
an unfair labor practice is occurring.
86. The Supreme Court has consistently condemned secondary pressures. See, eg., Interna-
tional Longshoreman's Assn v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 222-26 nn.19-24 (1982); National
Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 627 (1967) ("central theme" of § 8(b)(4) said to be
"the protection of neutrals against secondary pressure"); Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 63-64; Local 1976,
United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 100 (1958). Congress clearly intended
§ 8(b)(4)(ii) to prohibit all secondary pressures. See infra note 117.
87. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 7, 629 F.2d 653, 659 (10th Cir. 1980); see also
NLRB v. Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 400 U.S. 297, 302 (1971) (enactment of
§ 8(b)(4) was prompted by "congressional concern over the involvement of third parties in labor
disputes not their own"); Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368,
1377 (1st Cir. 1981) (long recognized that § 8(b)(4) was enacted to shield "unoffending employers
and others from pressures in controversies not their own") (quoting National Woodwork Mfrs.
Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 627 (1967)), aff'd, 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
88. Section 8(b)(4) derived its present form from the Landrum-Griffin Amendments, Pub. L.
No. 86-257, § 704(a), 73 Stat. 519, 542-43 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)
(1982)), which "culminated a congressional effort begun in 1947 to prohibit union pressure on em-
ployers not directly involved in a labor dispute." Note, Picketing and Publicity under Section 8(b)(4)
of the LMRA, 73 YALE L.J. 1265, 1265 (1964).
89. Gilmore v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Int'l Union, 223 F. Supp 236, 245 (N.D. I11.
1963).
90. Although this Article focuses on the practice of handbilling, judicial antipathy toward sec-
ondary boycotts extends to "don't patronize" lists as well. A union acts unlawfully when it puts a
secondary employer on its "don't patronize" list with the intent to force that employer to cease
doing business with the primary employer. See Boxhorn's Big Muskego Gun Club, Inc. v. Electrical
Workers Local 494, 620 F. Supp. 1073, 1079 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
91. 631 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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secondary employer.92 At the urging of the NLRB, the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals held that such activity constituted an impermissible
secondary boycott outside the protection of section 8(b)(4)'s publicity proviso.93
The court first found that a union could call for a boycott only of those products
made by the primary employer and sold by the secondary employer.94 As dis-
cussed previously, the Supreme Court had held such activity permissible in Tree
Fruits sixteen years earlier.9 5 However, the court in National Association of
Broadcast Employees96 distinguished the total boycott in which the union urges
a boycott of all the secondary employer's products; the court held that form of
secondary pressure to be illegal even when conducted by means of handbilling.97
Other courts have reached the same conclusion regarding a union's use of hand-
bills to promote a total secondary boycott.
98
A more difficult problem arises when the union threatens the secondary
employer with secondary pressures. The corporate campaign described in this
Article involved numerous instances of such threats.99 If the union threatens to
conduct an illegal secondary boycott and intends to dissuade a secondary em-
ployer from carrying the primary employer's goods, then clearly such pressure
represents an unfair labor practice. 1°° But what if the union threatens to con-
duct lawful secondary activity, such as calling for a product boycott at the sec-
ondary level or handbilling with leaflets that merely inform the customers of the
union's dispute with the primary employer and the secondary employer's rela-
tion to that primary employer? 10' Do threats to conduct lawful secondary activ-
ities violate section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA if those threats are designed to compel
a secondary boycott? The answer should be "no."
In NLRB v. Servette, Inc. ,102 a companion case to Tree Fruits, the Supreme
92. Id. at 947.
93. Id. at 952-53.
94. Id. at 953. Of course, when the struck product comprises all or a substantial portion of the
secondary employer's business, a product boycott becomes a total boycott. The United States
Supreme Court has correctly held that § 8(b)(4) prohibits a product boycott that has the predictable
effect of operating as a total secondary boycott. See Retail Store Employees, 447 U.S. at 613-15;
supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing Retail Store Employees).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
96. 631 F.2d 944.
97. Id. at 953. The court based its holding on the distinction the Tree Fruits Court established
between total and product boycotts. Id. The former is said to be "poles apart" from the latter. Tree
Fruits, 377 U.S. at 70.
98. See, e.g., Solien v. United Steelworkers, 593 F.2d 82, 87 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
828 (1979); Potter v. Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 142, 192 F. Supp. 641, 642-43 (W.D. Tex. 1961);
Brown v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 191 F. Supp. 676, 680-81 (N.D. Cal. 1961);
Phillips v. Local 662, Radio & Television Eng'rs, 192 F. Supp. 643, 645 (E.D. Tenn. 1960). But see
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 662 F.2d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating that Congress
intended to allow coercive pressure of neutral employers through handbilling), vacated, 463 U.S. 147
(1983).
99. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Brown v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 191 F. Supp. 676, 679
(N.D. Cal. 1961); Phillips v. Local 662, Radio & Television Eng'rs, 192 F. Supp. 643, 645 (E.D.
Tenn. 1960).
101. Engaging in such activities without any accompanying threats is explicitly permitted by the
publicity proviso. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).
102. 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
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Court drew a distinction between the use of threats to conduct lawful secondary
activity and the use of threats to conduct unlawful secondary activity. The
Court held that a union did not commit an unfair labor practice when, at a
secondary employer's store, the union distributed handbills that called for a con-
sumer product boycott of the primary employer's products sold at the store.103
The Court based its decision on the publicity proviso, which it viewed as an
exception to the strictures of section 8(b)(4)(ii). The Court further held, how-
ever, that the union could threaten to pass out such handbills at any stores that
continued carrying any of the primary employer's goods, apparently even if the
union intended to use such threats to coerce secondary employers into ceasing
all business with the primary employer. "The statutory protection for the distri-
bution of handbills would be undermined if a threat to engage in protected con-
duct were not itself protected." 1° 4
The latter holding in Servette is curious. The Court did not explain how
statutorily protected handbilling would be undermined if a union could not use
the threat of such activity to coerce retailers into boycotting the primary em-
ployer. Subsection 8(b)(4)(ii) of the NLRA expressly prohibits threats and coer-
cion that have as their object forcing a secondary employer to cease doing
business with the primary employer. 10 5 To reach its holding the Court had to
go through the mental gymnastics of first finding implicit in section 8(b)(4) the
permissibility of handbilling that calls for a secondary product boycott regard-
less of the union's purpose. 10 6 The Court then in effect reasoned that to protect
this implicitly permitted activity, it had to interpret the express strictures of
section 8(b)(4)(ii) to mean something other than what they say.10 7 The Servette
Court should have held that the statutory prohibition on secondary boycotts
would be undermined if a threat to engage in permitted conduct, as a means of
enforcing the boycott, was not also prohibited. Instead, the Court twisted the
logic of section 8(b)(4) by finding primacy in the publicity proviso rather than in
the text of section 8(b)(4).
Three years prior to the Servette decision, a federal district court adopted a
better approach to this problem. In Brown v. American Federation of Television
& Radio Artists, San Francisco Local 10 8 a union on strike against a radio station
attempted to put pressure on the station by pressuring its advertisers. The union
"used various means to exert coercive pressure on those advertisers, in order to
compel them to boycott [the station]."' 10 9 For example, (1) the union threatened
to publicize the advertisers' patronage of the "unfair" employer; (2) union sup-
porters organized a telephone campaign in which callers threatened the advertis-
103. See id. at 55.
104. Id. at 57.
105. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents... to threaten,
coerce, or restrain any person ... where.., an object thereof is... forcing or requiring any person
... to cease doing business with any other person .... 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii) (1982).
106. See Servette, 377 U.S. at 53-54.
107. See supra text accompanying note 104.
108. 191 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
109. Id. at 677.
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ers with a boycott of their products if the advertisers did not stop advertising
with the employer; (3) the union printed various leaflets naming advertisers that
continued to run advertisements on the station. The union then threatened to
distribute the leaflets if the advertisements were not pulled; and (4) the union
sent letters to advertisers warning that those advertisers who supported the sta-
tion would be viewed as taking sides in the labor dispute and would be
remembered by union members and sympathizers. "10
The Brown court first held that distribution of the leaflets violated subsec-
tion 8(b)(4)(ii) of the NLRA, reasoning that such total secondary boycott activ-
ity constituted "coercion of the employers to force them to cease doing business
with [the station].""' Furthermore, the court condemned all union threats to
distribute such handbills when the object of those threats was to force the adver-
tisers to cease doing business with the radio station.
In all events, even if respondents were entitled to publicize the facts by
circulating such a leaflet, they were not entitled to threaten [the sta-
tion's] advertisers, engaged in commerce, with such action, in order to
force or require them to cease doing business with [the station]. It is
not true that one may threaten to do whatever he may [legally] do.
One may not threaten to take lawful action, where the purpose of the
threat is illicit.' 
12
In other words, the Brown court condemned any union pressures that, in effect,
would "blackmail"' 13 neutral parties into discontinuing their business with the
primary employer.
As the holding in Brown suggests, the United States Supreme Court in
Servette failed to grasp the key to subsection 8(b)(4)(ii) of the NLRA-namely
its proscriptive element. After all, that proscriptive element forms the raison
d'etre for the entirety of section 8(b) as evidenced by both the structure of the
statute114 and its legislative history. 115 Because Congress' overriding intent in
110. See id. at 677-78.
111. Id. at 680. The Brown court rejected the argument that either the publicity proviso or the
first amendment protected the distribution of such handbills. Id. at 679-80. The first amendment
issue was also addressed in Retail Store Employees, 447 U.S. at 616, in which a plurality of the
Supreme Court summarily rejected the assertion that the first amendment protects union calls for
secondary boycotts.
112. Brown, 191 F. Supp. at 679; see also Phillips v. Local 662, Radio & Television Eng'rs, 192
F. Supp. 643, 645 (E.D. Tenn. 1960) (enjoining act of mailing proposed leaflet to secondary em-
ployer's premises with notation, "We would rather not add you to list."). The court granted the
injunction sought by the NLRB, finding that the union's practices transgressed the "freedom of
neutral persons to operate business without undue pressure." Id. at 645.
113. A classic definition of blackmail provides as follows: An "[u]nlawful demand... under
threat to do bodily harm, to injure property, to accuse of crime, or to expose disgraceful defects."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 155 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). This textual reference to black-
mail serves only by way of analogy in the context of a labor-management dispute.
114. Section 8(b) of the NLRA first and foremost constitutes a list of conduct in which labor
unions may not engage. The publicity proviso then clarifies congressional intent with respect to one
proscription. In other words, a union's activities do not constitute unlawful secondary coercion if
those activities merely publicize a dispute and are not intended to have coercive secondary effects.
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).
115. The Taft-Hartley Act, otherwise known as the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,
ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)) contained the original pro-
scription of secondary boycotts, but gaping loopholes led to union abuses. See Note, supra note 88,
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enacting the section was to prohibit undesirable conduct, a court errs when it
focuses instead on a narrow exception, gleans legislative purpose from that ex-
ception, and formulates its understanding of the rule based on the perceived
animating force for the exception. The Supreme Court took a backward ap-
proach. Coercion of secondary employers is the evil, and the exception to the
rule must be understood in light of that overriding concern. 116 Any union
threat against a secondary employer that seeks as its object a cessation or cur-
tailing of business with the primary employer is unlawful unless the union's ac-
tivity falls within the narrow wording of the publicity proviso.
11 7
4. NLRB v. Federal Judiciary-Why the Conflict?
Notwithstanding the judicial confusion concerning the lawfulness of threats
to do lawful acts, the case law on total secondary boycotts makes clear that a
total secondary boycott, even one conducted through the use of media other
than pickets," 8 is unlawful. The NLRB apparently would not accept this posi-
tion.119 How could the NLRB have been so confused over the years?
Theoretically, the courts should defer to the NLRB regarding matters in
which the NLRB has expertise.' 20 However, the NLRB has no particular ex-
pertise in interpreting statutes12 1 and, as an Article 1122 adjudicative body, must
at 1265-66. Those abuses prompted Congress to adopt the Landrum-Griffin Amendments in 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 541 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)), which Congress
enacted to close the loopholes. See Comment, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments: Labor's Use of
the Secondary Boycott, 45 CORNELL L. Q. 724, 727 (1960). A congressional conference committee
inserted the publicity proviso into the bill; it had not been a part of either the house or senate version
of the amendment to § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA. See Note, supra note 88, at 1271 n.32 and materials
cited therein.
116. Cf. Iodice v. Calabrese, 345 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd in part and rey'd in part,
512 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1975). In lodice the union had threatened secondary employers with future
union trouble if those secondary employers continued to do business with the primary employer.
lodice, 345 F. Supp. at 254. The trial court found such threats to be an unfair labor practice. Id. at
263. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the award of monetary
damages and focused its analysis on the coercion: "When a labor organization takes action for the
purpose of forcing an employer to cease doing business with another, it violates § 8(b)(4)(B) ... 
lodice, 512 F.2d at 388.
117. Senator Robert Taft, Jr., who sponsored the Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)), stated adamantly that all forms of secondary boycott
should be prohibited by the Act: "Our committee heard evidence for weeks and never succeeded in
having anyone tell us any difference between different kinds of secondary boycotts. So we have so
broadened the provision dealing with secondary boycotts as to make them an unfair labor practice."
93 CONG. REC. 4198 (1947). As discussed infra text accompanying notes 131-145, the publicity
proviso is not an exception to the proscriptive language of § 8(b)(4). Rather, the proviso clarifies
legislative intent.
118. If union members display pickets that call for a total boycott of that secondary employer,
then that activity constitutes an unfair labor practice. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Frattaroli v. NLRB, 526 F.2d 1189, 1193 (1st Cir. 1975); United Steelworkers v.
NLRB, 430 F.2d 519, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
121. Cf. Horwath v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 1093, 1097 n.4 (7th Cir. 1976) (NLRB given no extraordi-
nary judicial deference in interpretation of contracts), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977); Retail
Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 510 F.2d 802, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (NLRB given no particular defer-
ence in interpretation of contracts).
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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defer on questions of law to Article 111123 courts.' 2 4 Although the NLRB
should defer to judicial interpretations of section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, it does
not do so. The board instead looks almost exclusively to its own decisions' 25
and, of course, to decisions of the United States Supreme Court, notwithstand-
ing a well-developed body of case law in lower federal courts. If the NLRB
followed the sound judicial construction of section 8(b)(4), it would find total
secondary boycotts within the prohibitions of section 8(b)(4).
5. Interpreting the Publicity Proviso
As noted previously, the NLRB has sanctioned total secondary boycotts so
long as they do not involve picketing. The NLRB's position stems from an erro-
neous interpretation of the publicity proviso contained in section 8(b)(4) of the
NLRA. 126 That proviso has generated much more confusion and controversy
than it warrants.127
A well-established rule of statutory construction states that courts will not
employ interpretive devices to glean meaning from a statute unless there exists
an ambiguity in the statute or the statute is otherwise unclear. 128 Congress
made its intentions clear in drafting the publicity proviso. A union violates sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) when it:
(1) threatens, coerces or restrains;
(2) any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce;
(3) with an object of;
(4) forcing any other person to sever business relations with any other
person.
129
The publicity proviso then protects the following:
(1) publicity other than picketing;
(2) for the purpose of;
(3) truthfully advising the public, including consumers and workers;
(4) that products are produced by a primary employer with which the
union has a dispute, and that a secondary employer distributes those prod-
ucts; but only if
(5) such publicity does not have the effect of causing a walkout at the
123. Id. art. II.
124. Article I bodies are Congressional creations; article III courts are constitutionally pre-
scribed. For a discussion of the relationship between them, see Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); Note, Bankruptcy and the Limits of Federal Jurisdic-
tion, 95 HARv. L. REV. 703, 704-08 (1982).
125. Any random review of NLRB decisions shows that a clear majority of citations by the
NLRB are to its own decisions.
126. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
127. For an early discussion of potential issues raised by the publicity proviso, see Comment,
supra note 115, at 759-66.
128. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978); Carlson v. Commis-
sioner, 712 F.2d 1314, 1315 (9th Cir. 1983); Connec';cut v. EPA, 656 F.2d 902, 909 (2d Cir. 1981).




One striking aspect of the publicity proviso is that it does not constitute at
all an exception to the prohibitory language of section 8(b)(4). The proviso and
the general rule of section 8(b)(4) are mutually exclusive. The prohibitory lan-
guage contained in section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA condemns coercion that has as
an object forcing the neutral secondary employer to sever business relations with
the primary employer. The publicity proviso protects certain union conduct
only if the sole purpose of that conduct is to advise the public truthfully of the
strike against the primary employer and of the secondary employer's distribu-
tion of the primary employer's goods. 131 Of course, if a union's activities fit
within the publicity proviso, the union would not violate section 8(b)(4)(ii): if a
union's only purpose is to advise the public truthfully of its grievances, it cannot
also have a coercive purpose. The proviso simply means that section 8(b)(4)
does not prohibit certain nonpicketing publicity if the union does not intend it to
be coercive.' 32 Congress has made a union's motive the touchstone of liability,
and neither the courts nor the NLRB should hesitate to inquire into that
motive. 133
In other words, to come within the ambit of the publicity proviso, a union
must act solely for the purpose of truthfully advising the public of its primary
dispute and the second employer's relationship with the primary employer.
134
Otherwise the publicity proviso is inapplicable and does not shield the union's
conduct. 135 If the union has an ulterior motive, the publicity proviso does not
apply, and if that ulterior motive extends to coercion of the neutral secondary
employer, the union commits an unfair labor practice. If the union's literature
130. See id. § 158(b)(4).
131. With an apparent disregard for the statutory language of the publicity proviso, Professor
Cox has described the proviso as one that "permits unfair lists, radio broadcasts, newspaper adver-
tising, sound tracks and every other form of publicity except picketing, for the purpose of inducing
consumers to boycott.., a distributor who does business with an unfair producer." See Cox, supra
note 62, at 274 (emphasis added). Section 8(b)(4) expressly condemns such a purpose, and the pub-
licity proviso protects only an entirely different purpose. Perhaps Professor Cox's indiscretion may
be dismissed as one of his admitted "shortcomings of a protagonist." See id. at 257.
132. One student commentator has suggested that a union would never handbill a secondary
employer unless the union had some coercive motives and, therefore, using the union's motive as a
touchstone of liability would write the publicity proviso out of the statute. See Comment, supra note
115, at 765. The commentator's speculation concerning likely union motives is one of fact that, if
true, would not write the proviso out of the statute but would prevent a union from invoking it.
Simply because unions will rarely if ever qualify is not an argument for disregarding the plain words
of the proviso.
133. Despite the obvious primacy of motives in § 8(b)(4), courts as well as the NLRB do not
make the necessary inquiry into union motives. The product boycott serves as a perfect example. If
a union pickets a distributor calling for a boycott of the primary employer's goods sold by the
distributor, the critical question under § 8(b)(4)(ii) is whether the union intends to compel the dis-
tributor to cease carrying the primary employer's goods. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held
such activity to be permissible without any inquiry into motives. See Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. 58. The
Court ignored the statute and focused directly on the legislative history. See id. at 63. The Court's
disregard for the words of the statute led the Court to its erroneous holding.
134. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982) (publicity protected only if "for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public") (emphasis added).
135. See Hospital & Service Employers Union, Local 399 v. NLRB, 743 F.2d 1417, 1424-25 (9th
Cir. 1984) (if handbill or any part thereof is not solely for the purpose described in publicity proviso,
the proviso does not apply).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
contains extraneous material that is not designed to advise the public truthfully
of the primary dispute and the relationship of the secondary employer to that
dispute, the union cannot invoke the publicity proviso. 136
A final requirement for making use of the publicity proviso is that the mate-
rial be "publicity." The legislative history behind the Landrum-Griffin amend-
ments, however, supplies no useful definition of the term. 137 Nevertheless, a
word is ordinarily interpreted in its plain, everyday sense. 138 The term "public-
ity" in its ordinary sense simply does not contemplate advocacy or a call to
action such as a plea to boycott. 139 Thus, when a union calls on consumers to
cease doing business with a distributor of the primary employer's goods, that
call does not comprise publicity' 4° and therefore is not covered by the publicity
proviso. 141
136. Id. Inapplicability of the publicity proviso does not entail a § 8(b)(4) violation. For exam-
ple, a union may call for a primary strike and not come within the protection of the publicity pro-
viso, and yet not violate § 8(b)(4).
137. The legislative history appears in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MAN-
AGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 (1959).
138. See, e.g., Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S.
347, 362-63 (1964).
139. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1836 (1981) (listing 6
definitions of the word "publicity," none of which incorporates the word "advocacy"). Congress
clearly knew the difference between publicity and advocacy. In 29 U.S.C. § 104(e) (1982) (prohibit-
ing injunctions of certain forms of publicity), Congress has called for protection of certain publicity.
Congress has used a separate section of the same statute to protect certain advocacy. See id. § 104(i).
If Congress had intended to protect advocacy with the publicity proviso, it would have done so.
140. Senator John F. Kennedy tried to fit the total secondary boycott within the scope of the
publicity proviso when he was discussing the proviso before the Senate in 1959. Kennedy had
chaired the conference committee, which inserted the publicity proviso into the framework of
§ 8(b)(4) of the NLRA. In the committee Kennedy had pressed for pro-union wording in the
amendments and, more specifically, had pressed for a proviso that would permit total secondary
boycotts. Nonetheless, he was unable to convince his conferees, and the conference committee rec-
ommended the proviso as it now appears. In discussing the proviso before the full Senate, however,
Kennedy attempted the ruse of legislating by comment. Although he was unable to obtain confer-
ence committee approval for his version, he was able to "interpret" what did pass as though it were
the one he had favored. Senator Kennedy told his fellow senators that the publicity proviso would
protect a union's "right to appeal to consumers by methods other than picketing asking them to
refrain from buying goods made by nonunion labor or to refrain from trading with a retailer who
sells such goods." 105 CONG. REC. 17,898 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). Of course, the pro-
viso, as enacted, does not protect the right of a union to ask consumers to do anything. The proviso
merely authorizes unions to inform customers of their dispute with management. Senator Kennedy
admitted that:
Under the [House version] it would have been impossible for a union to inform the custom-
ers of a secondary employer that the employer or store was selling goods which were made
under racket conditions or sweatshop conditions, or in a plant where an economic strike
was in progress. We were not able to persuade the House conferees to permit picketing in
front of that secondary shop, but we were able to persuade them to agree that the union
shall be free to conduct informational activity short of picketing.
Id. 17,898-99.
At least one court has been drawn in by Senator Kennedy's ruse. See Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. NLRB, 662 F.2d 264, 270 n.4 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting Senator Kennedy's remarks in
support of proposition that publicity proviso protects calls for total secondary boycotts), vacated,
463 U.S. 147 (1982). This example illustrates the danger of relying too heavily on legislative history,
especially when the statute construed is plainly worded.
141. Furthermore, the call for a product boycott does not constitute "publicity" as that term is
properly understood. Thus, the Supreme Court should reconsider its holding in Tree Fruits with




Properly understood and interpreted, the publicity proviso constitutes a
safe harbor within section 8(b)(4) and a clarification of congressional intent.
Unless labor union practices are undertaken with a coercive intent, they should
not be deemed illegal simply because those practices have the incidental and
unintended effect of causing a cessation of business between the primary and
secondary employer. 14 2 The publicity proviso reflects congressional concern
about a union's right under the first amendment 143 to publicize its dispute with
the primary employer. 144 A call for a total secondary boycott is not protected
by the first amendment. 145 This aspect of a union's corporate campaign activi-
ties fits within neither the raison d'etre nor the plain words of the publicity
proviso.
C. Prohibited Agreements Under Section 8(e)
Although section 8(e) of the NLRA is rarely invoked, at least in secondary
boycott cases, that section proscribes the fruits of successful prohibited secon-
dary boycott activities:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any
employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied,
whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain
from.., selling ... or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any
other employer or to cease doing business with any other person
146
Section 8(e) works in tandem with subsection 8(b)(4)(ii)(A), 147 which prohibits
unions from using threats or coercion when an object thereof is "forcing or re-
quiring any employer or self-employed person.., to enter into any agreement
which is prohibited by subsection (e) of this section."' 14 8 The limited case law
under section 8(e) suggests that the statutory provision means precisely what it
says. If a union agrees with an employer that the employer will cease doing
business with any other person, both the union and the employer commit an
unfair labor practice. 149
The wording of section 8(e) lends considerable support to the notion that
142. The publicity proviso constitutes an expression of congressional concern for the effects of
union activities. The exception to the publicity proviso states that the proviso only applies
as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by
any person other than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to
pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services at the establishment
of the employer engaged in such distribution.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982). Thus, Congress designed the publicity proviso to permit unions to
influence business between the primary and secondary employer if that influence was unintentional,
but to prohibit any action that had the effect of causing a secondary boycott.
143. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
144. See Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 69.
145. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980); Brown,
191 F. Supp. at 679-680.
146. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982) (emphasis added).
147. For a discussion of the relationship between § 8(b)(4) and § 8(e), see Lesnick, Job Security
and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA §§ 8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1000 (1965).
148. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(A) (1982).
149. See Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 609 F.2d
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Congress intended to prohibit a union's call for a total secondary boycott by
whatever means. Section 8(e) proscribes agreements "express or implied,"
which indicates that either of the two following scenarios would constitute a
prohibited agreement:
Scenario A: Union calls for total boycott of secondary employer and
leaflets secondary employer's business with "don't patronize" litera-
ture. On the second day of the boycott, secondary employer calls for a
meeting with union representatives at which the parties agree that
union will stop the boycott and secondary employer will quit ordering
primary employer's products. Prohibited express agreement.150
Scenario B: The same as Scenario A, except on the second day of the
boycott secondary employer relents and unilaterally announces that it
will no longer carry primary employer's goods. Both secondary em-
ployer and union understand that secondary employer's cessation of
business with primary employer will result in an end to the boycott.
Prohibited implied agreement.
Although at first scenario B may appear to demonstrate nothing more than uni-
lateral capitulation on the part of the secondary employer, the existence of an
implicit agreement is clear given the shared undertaking of the parties. 151 To
hold otherwise would write out of the statute section 8(e)'s proscription of im-
plied agreements.
Because in either scenario both the union and the employer may commit
unfair labor practices, two anomalous consequences would result if the publicity
proviso contained in section 8(b)(4) allowed unions to exert total secondary boy-
cott pressures. First, the union's call for a total secondary boycott would consti-
tute a protected activity only if the call were unsuccessful. The moment an
employer relents, the union crosses into unlawfulness and drags the neutral sec-
ondary employer along with it. Surely Congress did not intend to permit only
unsuccessful secondary boycott pressures. Second, the secondary employer
would be placed in an untenable position in the face of nonpicketing total secon-
dary boycott activities. That secondary employer could not complain about sec-
ondary pressures exerted by the union, 152 and it could not give in. If it relented,
then it would commit an unfair labor practice under section 8(e).153 Thus the
1368, 1375 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982); Altemose Constr. Co. v. Atlantic Cape
May, 493 F. Supp. 1181, 1192 (D.N.J. 1980).
150. The union in this scenario may or may not have already violated § 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) or (B) of
the NLRA, depending on its purpose in calling for the boycott. In reality, the union would have no
purpose other than causing a secondary employer to cease doing business with the primary em-
ployer, in which case both § 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (D) are violated. In unambiguous language, those
subsections proscribe secondary pressure designed to compel agreements to honor total secondary
boycotts and those boycotts themselves.
151. The fact finder would determine whether the union and the secondary employer had im-
pliedly acted in concert.
152. If the secondary pressure is illegal, as this Article suggests, the secondary employer may
complain to the NLRB or bring a private damage action. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 160, 187 (1982).
153. Although § 8(e) violations cannot form the basis for a private damage action, see id. § 187,




neutral secondary employer would have to endure the boycott and become en-
meshed in a labor dispute not its own.
Curiously, although section 8(e) represents a natural counterpart to section
8(b)(4)(ii), and although the publicity proviso clearly does not qualify section
8(e),15 4 the latter section is rarely invoked in secondary boycott cases. It can
soundly be invoked whenever, as in the case of the UBC's corporate campaign
against Louisiana-Pacific, a union extracts an express or implied agreement that,
in exchange either for the cessation of boycott activities or for a promise not to
conduct boycott activities, the secondary employer ceases to carry the primary
employer's products.15 5
Whether lawful or not, union pressures may form the basis for an unlawful
agreement. For example, a secondary product boycott, which the United States
Supreme Court unwisely held lawful in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers
(Tree Fruits), 156 may produce a prohibited express or implied agreement under
section 8(e). Concomitantly, whenever a union exerts secondary pressure on an
employer in an attempt to extract such an agreement, the union violates section
8(b)(4)(ii)(A) of the NqLRA. 157 In short, the unfair labor practice statutes are
cohesive, coherent, and clear, and they prohibit many of the tactics used in the
corporate campaign.
IV. ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF CORPORATE CAMPAIGN AcTivITIES
In addition to unfair labor practice implications, the corporate campaign
carries with it antitrust implications. In some cases the same acts that form a
basis for liability under the NLRA also will serve as a basis for liability under
antitrust laws. 158 As in the unfair labor practice analysis, the starting point for
154. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982) ("For the purpose of this section 4 only").
155. To violate § 8(e) of the NLRA, an agreement obviously requires some form of considera-
tion. Noncoercive requests that a secondary employer stop dealing with the primary employer are
not prohibited. See Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 259 n.14 (1964); Altemose Constr.
Co. v. Atlantic Cape May, 493 F. Supp. 1181, 1192 (D.N.J. 1980). Cf. Lesnick, supra note 147, at
1012 & n.52 (questioning the notion that a union's request can ever be "noncoercive" and criticizing
without explanation the Supreme Court's requirement of consideration before finding an agreement
to exist under § 8(e)).
156. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
157. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(A) (1982) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization to force or require "any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or
employer organization or to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by subsection (e) of this
section."
158. The relationship between the antitrust laws and labor law has been the subject of a tremen-
dous amount of analysis in the literature. The following authorities comprise a partial list: Barnes,
Goldberg, & Miller, Unions and the Antitrust Laws, 7 LAB. L.J. 133 (1956); Boudin, Organized
Labor and the Clayton Act, 29 VA. L. REV. 272 (1942); Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Dis-
putes: I1, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 15 (1940); Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes: I, 39
COLUM. L. REV. 1283 (1939); CCH, Interface of National Labor and Antitrust Policies: When Anti-
trust Liability Attaches, 33 LAB. L.J. 115 (1982); Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary
Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252 (1955); Di Cola, Labor Antitrust. Pennington, Jewel Tea, and
Subsequent Meandering, 33 U. PrrT. L. REV. 705 (1972); Handler, Labor and Antitrust: A Bit of
History, 40 ANTITRUST L.J. 233 (1970); Handler & Zifchak, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust
Laws: The Emasculation of the Labor Exemption, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (1981); Hoffman, Labor
and Antitrust Policy: Drawing a Line of Demarcation, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1983); Schulman,
Labor and the Antitrust Laws, 34 ILL. L. REV. 769 (1940); St. Antoine, Secondary Boycott: From
1986]
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an antitrust analysis is the statutory regime.
A. The Legislative Framework
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 5 9 provide the relevant substantive
proscriptions. These sections outlaw, respectively, combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade and attempts at monopolization. The statute also provides
labor unions with numerous exemptions.'
60
Because labor organizations effectively restrain labor markets, many courts
originally interpreted the Sherman Act to outlaw unions as unlawful combina-
tions.' 61 In response Congress enacted section 6 of the Clayton Act, 162 which
declares that the labor of a human being is not a commodity subject to the anti-
trust laws and that unions are exempt from the prohibitions of all antitrust laws
so long as they are "lawfully carrying out [their] legitimate objects." This Arti-
cle examines that phrase in depth below.'
63
Section 20 of the Clayton Act' 64 also exempts certain union activities from
antitrust scrutiny. However, unlike section 6, section 20 contains a long list of
permissible activities.' 65 For example, section 20 specifically allows a union to
Antitrust to Labor Relations, 40 ANTITRUST L.J. 242 (1971); Winter, Collective Bargaining and
Competition: The Application ofAntitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963);
Note, From Norris-LaGuardia to Connell-Consistency Yields Comprehensive Labor Antitrust Protec-
tion, 17 NEW ENG. L. REv. 845 (1982).
159. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982).
160. See infra notes 164-75 and accompanying text.
161. On its face, the Sherman Act seems to outlaw labor unions because a union is a combina-
tion that restrains labor markets. However, the United States Supreme Court quickly interpreted
the Sherman Act to proscribe only unreasonable restraints of trade. See, eg., Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). After Standard Oil the question was whether a labor union consti-
tuted an "unreasonable" restraint of trade. The answer for many courts was yes. Between 1890 and
1914 at least 101 cases resulted in injunctions of labor union activities under the Sherman Act, a fact
Congress recognized in passing the Clayton Act. See 51 CONG. REC. 9173-74, 13,665-66 (1914).
Many of those lower court decisions postdated the Supreme Court's Standard Oil decision in 1911.
162. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982)).
163. See infra text accompanying notes 187-208.
164. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982).
165. Section 20 of the Clayton Act provides as follows:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United States,
or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and employees, or be-
tween employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and
persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or
conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to
a property right, of the party making the application, for which injury there is no adequate
remedy at law, and such property or property right must be described with particularity in
the application, which must be in writing and sworn to by the applicant or by his agent or
attorney.
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons,
whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment, or from ceas-
ing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others
by peaceful means so to do; or from attending at any place where any such person or
persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating infor-
mation, or from peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or from peacefully
persuading any person to work or to abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or
to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading
others by peaceful and lawful means so to do; or from paying or giving to, or withholding
from, any person engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits or other moneys or things of
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cease patronizing a party to a dispute over working conditions or wages and to
persuade others to cease patronizing that party. 166 Thus the primary boycott
cannot form a basis for antitrust liability in the corporate campaign.' 67 How-
ever, section 20 does not exempt or otherwise apply to secondary boycott activi-
ties.168 Such activities, therefore, must be scrutinized under a traditional
antitrust analysis, unless some other exemption applies.
Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 169 prohibits injunctions that prevent
unions from doing certain specified acts. 170 That section lists acts afforded par-
value; or from peacebly assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes; or from
doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of such dispute by any
party thereto; nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to
be violations of any law of the United States.
15 U.S.C. § 20 (1982).
166. The relevant portion of the statute provides that "no ... restraining order or injunction
shall prohibit any person or persons... from ceasing to patronize... any party to [a labor] dispute
.. or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do... nor shall [such acts] be consid-
ered... violations of any law of the United States." Id.
167. Nor can the primary boycott form a basis for an unfair labor practice claim. See id. For an
explanation of the difference between primary and secondary boycotts, see supra note 62.
168. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 475-477 (1921). The extent to which
other aspects of Duplex have been overruled by later statutory development is discussed infra text
accompanying notes 251-55.
169. 29 U.S.C § 104 (1982).
170. Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides as follows:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dis-
pute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these
terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following
acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any employer or-
ganization, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is described in section 103 of
this Title;
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or interested in
such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or insurance, or other moneys or
things of value;
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any labor dispute
who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any action or suit in any court of the
United States or of any State;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute,
whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or
violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interests in a
labor dispute;
(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the acts heretofore
specified;
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts heretofore specified;
and
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence the acts
heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is described in sec-
tion 103 of this Title.
Id.
Although § 20 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1982), exempts the enumerated activities
from antitrust scrutiny, § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982), only prohibits a
court from enjoining the activities listed in that statute. The unmistakable inference is that Congress
did not intend to give the type of blanket protection it provided in the Clayton Act to the activities
set forth in § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
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tial protection, including the use of publicity to notify the public of the existence
and circumstances of a labor dispute, 171 notifying any person of the union's in-
tent to engage in a protected activity, 172 and agreeing with any other person to
engage in a protected activity. 173 Section 4 activities, however, are not necessar-
ily lawful nor even exempt from antitrust scrutiny. Section 4's protection is only
partial because it only prohibits injunctions; 174 it does not limit the availability
of monetary damages.
175
In addition to the three explicit statutory provisions that exempt union ac-
tivities, courts have developed a "nonstatutory exemption"' 176 based on the per-
ceived relationship between federal antitrust policy and federal labor policy.
177
This so-called nonstatutory exemption dates back to two decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Work-
men v. Jewel Tea Co. 178 and Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters
Local 100. 179 In Connell the Supreme Court held that a union loses its antitrust
exemption when it attempts through coercion to force a general contractor to
use only union subcontractors.180 In so holding, the Court distinguished direct
restraints on a product market from indirect restraints on a product market that
result only from restraints on a labor market. The Court found a direct restraint
on the product market and held that the union had violated the Sherman Act.181
Lower courts have interpreted Connell to stand for the proposition that a labor
union enjoys an antitrust exemption for labor market restraints that only indi-
rectly restrain a product market.
182
171. 29 U.S.C. § 104(e) (1982).
172. Id. § 104(g).
173. Id. § 104(h).
174. Adoption of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was motivated, at least in part, by the "extravagant
use of the labor injunction." See Winter, supra note 158, at 15-16. Congress did not intend to
protect the activities listed in the Norris-LaGuardia Act from damage actions under the antitrust
laws. Otherwise, it would have done so as it had done in § 20 of the Clayton Act. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 52 (1982).
175. See, e.g., Republic Prods., Inc. v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 245 F. Supp. 475, 476-77
n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
176. This Article contends that there is nothing "nonstatutory" about the exemption. See infra
note 182.
177. An inherent conflict exists between antitrust laws, which seek to prohibit market restraints,
and labor laws, which foster labor market restraints. At least one commentator has pointed out the
difficulty of judicially reconciling federal antitrust and labor laws. See Di Cola, supra note 158, at
706. But see Hoffman, supra note 158, at 3-4 ("antitrust policy and labor policy need not work at
cross purposes").
178. 381 U.S. 676 (1965). In Jewel Tea the Supreme Court held that a market restraint can be
"so intimately related to wages, hours and working conditions that the unions' successful attempt to
obtain that provision ... falls within the protection of the national labor policy and is therefore
exempt from the Sherman Act." Id. at 689-90.
179. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
180, Id. at 625.
181. Id. at 622-25.
182. See Mid-American Regional Bargaining Ass'n v. Will City Carpenters Dist. Council, 675
F.2d 881 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982); Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwester Pa. Bldg.
& Constr. Trades Council, 609 F.2d 1368 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982). The
holdings of these courts, although justifiable, need not rest on the mystical term "nonstatutory ex-
emption." Section 6 of the Clayton Act expressly sanctions labor market restraints, and any re-
straints on the labor market necessarily create restraints on product markets. To find antitrust
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Of the four principal labor exemptions, only section 6 of the Clayton Act
substantially affects the corporate campaign. Restraints imposed by the corpo-
rate campaign constitute direct product restraints, not indirect restraints as in
Connell, and so make the nonstatutory exemption inapplicable. Section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act does not immunize unions from liability, but instead pro-
tects certain activities against injunctive relief. Furthermore, the laundry list of
protected activities in section 20 of the Clayton Act does not extend to the ag-
gressive tactics used in a corporate campaign.
B. The Scope of the Section 6 Exemption
An antitrust analysis of the corporate campaign, therefore, necessarily fo-
cuses on section 6 of the Clayton Act, which exempts only union activities that
are (1) lawful, and (2) in pursuit of legitimate union objectives. 183 For the ex-
emption to apply, both requirements must be satisfied.18 4 The express language
of section 6 makes clear that labor unions do not enjoy a blanket immunity from
the antitrust laws.' 85 If an exemption does not apply, then the union's activities
must undergo a traditional antitrust analysis.
18 6
To scrutinize a union's corporate campaign activities thoroughly in terms
of the section 6 exemptions, it is first necessary to understand which objectives a
union may lawfully and legitimately pursue under the Clayton Act. A union
may lose its section 6 exemption in three primary ways: (1) By conspiring with
nonunion groups; (2) by conducting illegal boycott activities; or (3) by commit-
ting violence. These activities, all of which may occur during a corporate cam-
paign, involve unlawful objectives that carry antitrust implications.
1. Lawfully Carrying Out Legitimate Union Objectives
The threshold question focuses on what it means for a union to be carrying
out legitimate union objectives. Unfortunately, the courts rarely ask the proper
questions anymore because they prefer to rely on judicially developed doctrine
rather than the statute itself. In 1929, however, Justice Pitney offered the fol-
lowing interpretation of section 6 of the Clayton Act: "[T]here is nothing in the
section to exempt such an organization or its members from accountability
where it or they depart from its normal and legitimate objects, and engage in an
actual combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade."'
8 7
Although Justice Pitney did not elaborate on his phrase "actual combina-
liability as a result of indirect product market restraints would eviscerate § 6 of the Clayton Act.
Such a finding would effectively outlaw labor unions.
183. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982).
184. See United States v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local 639, 32 F. Supp. 594 (D.D.C.
1940).
185. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 487-88 (1939); Embry Riddell Aeronautical
Univ. v. Ross Aviation, Inc., 504 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir. 1974); Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis Dairy
Co., 260 F.2d 46, 54 (8th Cir. 1958).
186. See, e.g., Republic Prods., Inc. v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 245 F. Supp. 475, 476
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Chattanooga Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, Inc., 116 F.
Supp 509, 510 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
187. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 469 (1921).
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tion or conspiracy in restraint of trade," the rest of the passage expresses a pref-
erence for staticism that reflects the conservative nature of the Court in the
1920s. 188 In Pitney's view, a union is exempt under section 6 of the Clayton Act
only if it acts the way unions normally act. Such a static view of a union's
legitimate objects has surfaced elsewhere as well.189
This conservative approach has enormous consequences for the corporate
campaign because of the campaign's novelty. Surely Congress did not intend to
prevent unions from employing new and better tactics if otherwise lawful.
Rather, the "legitimate objects" phrase can be understood best as an expression
that a union may permissibly pursue only those goals that justify a union's exist-
ence: Higher wages, shorter hours, and improved working conditions.190 A la-
bor organization may not, for example, refuse to unload Russian cargoes or to
work in a theater exhibiting an objectionable work as a means of political
protest. 191
Although the avowed intent to destroy an employer should not be a legiti-
mate union objective, 192 the courts appear confused on this point. The judiciary
has been hesitant to scrutinize labor objectives, a disinclination that also surfaces
in the unfair labor practice context.1 93 In Hunt v. Crumboch 194 plaintiff, an
employer, alleged that the union had engaged in a conspiracy that ultimately
destroyed his business and further alleged that the union was motivated simply
by spite. The Supreme Court found the union's motive to be irrelevant, 195
notwithstanding language contained in section 6 of the Clayton Act that refers
to the union's "objects."' 196 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has made a similar statement in dictum.197
188. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 434-35 (1978) (describing the conserva-
tive nature of the court during the "Lochner era").
189. See IPC Distribs. v. Chicago Moving Picture Mach. Operators Union, 132 F. Supp. 294,
299 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (A union "must be exercising the peaceful activities normally incident to achiev-
ing its usual and proper aims.").
190. See National Ass'n of Women & Children's Apparel Salesmen, Inc. v. FTC, 479 F.2d 139,
144 (5th Cir.) ("[T]he antitrust laws yield only insofar as the union pursues legitimate subjects of
collective bargaining."), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004 (1973); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, Local 88, 410 F.2d 650, 653 (8th Cir. 1969) ("But
when unions ... venture outside legitimate union interests they also step outside the boundary of
exemption."); Afran Transp. Co. v. National Maritime Union, 169 F. Supp 416, 423 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) ("A union may act in restraint of trade if it does so in furtherance of a legitimate labor purpose
• I • ,,"),
191. See, e.g., International Longshoremens Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, 456 U.S. 212, 225-26 (1982);
IPC Distribs. v. Chicago Moving Picture Mach. Operators Union, 132 F. Supp. 294, 299 (N.D. Ill.
1955).
192. UBC officials have more than once stated that their goal is the infliction of damage on
Louisiana-Pacific, even at the expense of a satisfactory collective bargaining agreement. See Union
Reg., Apr. 5, 1985, at 1, col. 3; Wall St. J., June 26, 1984, at 27, col. 1.
193. See supra note 133.
194. 325 U.S. 821 (1945).
195. Id. at 824-25.
196. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982) (exempting from antitrust liability union activities that lawfully
carry out "legitimate objects").
197. In Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ. v. Ross Aviation, Inc., 504 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974),
the court stated that
[a] union can, without forfeiting the exemption or substantively transgressing the antitrust
laws, act with a purpose to injure or even eliminate the business of an employer, no matter
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In light of policy concerns and statutory authority, these antitrust decisions
have drawn improper conclusions. The union may, for tactical reasons, state
that it intends to destroy the employer and act accordingly, all for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable collective bargaining agreement. Neither public policy nor
statutory authority, however, should exempt a union from antitrust liability
when it acts in restraint of trade for the actual purpose of destroying the
employer.
198
Furthermore, some courts confuse improper objectives with improper
means. For example, one court has held that forcing a third party to breach its
contract with the primary employer does not constitute a proper union goal,199
while another court has ruled similarly regarding a union's concerted refusal to
deal with the employer.2° ° Those acts were not union objects. Rather, the ac-
tivities found objectionable in both cases were means to other ends that must be
examined under the "lawful" language of section 6. As some courts correctly
have recognized, "the methods the union [chooses] are not immune from anti-
trust sanctions simply because the goal is legal."'20 1 Thus, a union that engages
in a corporate campaign may be pure at heart in its efforts to obtain better work-
ing conditions from the employer, and yet open itself to antitrust liability if its
tactics are "unlawful."
The use of a standard such as "lawful" in a statute that itself is designed to
describe lawful conduct creates obvious circularity problems that cannot be re-
solved completely in the case of section 6. To resolve the circularity, unlawful-
ness within the meaning of section 6 of the Clayton Act would have to be limited
to mean lawfulness outside antitrust laws. But as discussed below,202 one way
that a union may lose its exemption is by acting in concert with nonlabor
groups.
The courts' justifiable antipathy toward union conspiracies with business
entities derives from three primary sources, all of which are founded on antitrust
law. First, such conspiracies tend to place direct restraints on product markets
rather than indirect restraints through restrained labor markets,20 3 a dichotomy
whether it does so because it more or less legitimately defines its interests in terms of
injuring the employer or because of personal animus toward a particular employer.
Id. at 903. The court in IPC Distribs., Inc. v. Chicago Moving Picture Mach. Operators Union, 132
F. Supp. 294, 299 (N.D. Ill. 1955) stated: "Whatever the legitimate and normal objectives of a labor
union may be, they surely do not include a conspiracy to effectively stop one item of business."
Taken together, IPC Distributors, Embry-Riddle, and Hunt stand for the curious proposition that a
union may not seek to stop one item of business but may attempt to destroy the employer's entire
business.
198. It is significant, however, that the mere attempt to destroy an employer will not automati-
cally create antitrust liability for a union. In such a case, the union merely loses its exemption. The
actions of the union must then be scrutinized under standard antitrust principles.
199. United States v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local 639, 32 F. Supp. 594, 598 (D.D.C.
1940).
200. Westlab, Inc. v. Freedomland, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 701, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
201. Connell, 421 U.S. at 625.
202. See infra text accompanying notes 209-37.
203. See, e.g., Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S.
797, 809 (1945) (when union aids business in combining to restrain trade directly, it goes beyond
legitimate, indirect restraints).
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the Supreme Court recognized in Connell.2° 4 Second, courts rightly see in sec-
tion 6 of the Clayton Act a congressional expression of approval for union activi-
ties that look like union activities.205 Of course, problems arise in forcing a rigid
staticism on unions, a point that has been discussed above.20 6 Last, a union's
conspiracy with nonunion groups may be perceived not as a direct antitrust vio-
lation by the union, but as aiding and abetting its nonunion conspirators in their
antitrust violations.20 7 This "two cushion" analysis almost resolves the circular-
ity problems, but not quite. The concept of unlawfulness is difficult to under-
stand in the context of section 6 without resorting to some circularity; however
courts tend to avoid such detail. As noted previously, 20 8 courts have focused on
three primary ways that a union can lose its section 6 exemption, without ap-
pearing to worry about the exact wording of section 6.
2. Conspiracy with Nonunion Groups
Although its origin is unclear,20 9 and its soundness remains open to ques-
tion,2 10 a standard black letter rule still prevails in this area. This rule provides
that although a union is exempt from the antitrust laws when it acts unilaterally
and lawfully in pursuit of its own legitimate objectives, it loses its exemption if it
combines or conspires with a business or other nonlabor group.211 The jury
determines whether, as a question of fact, the union has entered into an im-
proper conspiracy with a nonlabor group.212 But the jury cannot make its deci-
sion unassisted. The trial judge must first decide whether the nonlabor group
with whom the union has conspired is the type that could expose the union to
204. See supra text accompanying note 181.
205. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 469 (1921).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 188-91.
207. See, e.g., Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797
(1945).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 183-87.
209. The notion that a union loses its antitrust exemption if it conspires with a nonunion group
may have originated with Justice Frankfurter's dictum in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219
(1940). Justice Frankfurter stated that a union's motives were irrelevant under § 20 of the Clayton
Act "[s]o long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups." Id.
at 232. The only authority Justice Frankfurter cited for this caveat was United States v. Brims, 272
U.S. 549 (1926), in which the Supreme Court upheld the convictions of both union members and
nonunion members under the Sherman Act. Id. at 553. In Brims, however, the Court did not
discuss a possible exemption for the union. Id. at 549-53.
Four years after Hutcheson, the Court decided Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1944), a case sometimes cited as the origin of the prohibition against unions
cooperating with nonunion groups. See, e.g., Davis Pleating and Button Co. v. California Sports-
wear & Dress Ass'n., 145 F. Supp. 864, 865 (S.D. Cal. 1956). In Allen Bradley the Court held that,
notwithstanding § 20 of the Clayton Act, a union may be held liable for antitrust violations as an
aider and abetter of a business' antitrust violation. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 809-10. Thus, under
the Allen Bradley reasoning, a union's liability in such cases is derivative: It requires a showing that
the nonlabor organization with whom the union combined was guilty of an antitrust violation.
Otherwise there is nothing to aid and abet.
210. See, e.g., Di Cola, supra note 158, at 714-15 (criticizing the Allen Bradley rule).
211. See, e.g., Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 810
(1945); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941); Julian v. Raytheon, 499 F. Supp. 949,
955 (D. Del. 1980); Davis Pleating & Button Co. v. California Sportswear & Dress Ass'n, 145 F.
Supp. 864, 865-66 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
212. See Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 260 F.2d 46, 55 (8th Cir. 1958).
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antitrust liability. The judge also must decide whether the conspiracy itself is of
a type that should result in a per se violation.213 It is significant that the type of
conspiracy that constitutes an unprotected combination with a nonlabor group
may result in a per se violation of the antitrust laws.2 14 This means that a plain-
tiff need not show any market effects to prevail.2 15
The threshold question thus concerns the type of nonilabor group that re-
sults in a loss of exemption for the union. This question has perplexed many
courts.2 1 6 Its importance for the corporate campaign cannot be overempha-
sized, however, because a typical corporate campaign involves, among other
things, cooperation with a variety of nonlabor groups.2 17
In cases in which courts have held unions liable for conspiracies with nonla-
bor groups, the nonlabor conspirators generally comprise other business enti-
ties. 218 At least one court has gone so far as to state that the nonlabor group
must have been in competition with the plaintiff at the time of the conspiracy. 2 19
Other courts apparently leave open the possibility that a conspiracy with a non-
business, nonunion group will destroy the union's exemption.2 20
Analytically, the courts should not distinguish between conspiracies in re-
straint of trade based solely on the nature of the coconspirators. Courts should
treat conspiracies between unions and all nonlabor groups the same. Nonbusi-
ness entities clearly are capable of violating antitrust laws.2 21 If the objection to
removing the exemption whenever a union conspires with, for example, an envi-
213. The second question requires no extensive analysis. The court simply determines whether
the combination or conspiracy is, as a matter of law, "in restraint of trade" within the meaning of § I
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). If the unprotected combination is in restraint of trade,
per se liability attaches. See infra text accompanying note 214.
214. See Southeast Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767, 775 (6th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971).
215. See, eg., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261-62 (1963); Battle v. Lubrizol
Corp., 673 F.2d 984, 987 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984).
216. See infra text accompanying notes 218-20.
217. In the corporate campaign against Louisiana-Pacific, these nonlabor groups included citi-
zens groups, environmental groups, stockholders, and a competitor of Louisiana-Pacific. See supra
text accompanying notes 34, 43-47, & 51.
218. See, eg., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Work-
men, Local 88, 410 F.2d 650, 653 (8th Cir. 1969) (union said to lose exemption if it conspires with
business people); United States v. Employing Lathers Ass'n, 212 F.2d 726, 729-30 (7th Cir. 1954)
(unions conspired with business contractors to suppress competition); Associated Orchestra Leaders
v. Philadelphia Music Soc'y, 203 F. Supp. 755, 759 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (exemption said to be lost when
union conspires with employers to restrain competition).
219. See Thompson Newspapers, Inc. v. Toledo Typographical Union, 387 F. Supp 351, 354
(E.D. Mich. 1974).
220. See, e.g., Afran Transp. Co. v. National Maritime Union, 169 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), in which the court stated:
The doctrine of these cases is in essence that unions are not exempt from provisions of the
Sherman Act if they combine with nonlabor groups to create business monopolies, to con-
trol the marketing of goods and services or to restrain trade.
A union may act in restraint of trade if it does so in furtherance of legitimate labor
purposes, either alone or in combination with other unions. If, however, it acts to restrain
trade in combination with nonlabor or business groups it violates the Sherman Act [and
has no exemption].
Id. at 423.
221. See generally ANTITRUST AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (J. Siena ed. 1982) (analyzing anti-
trust liability of local governments).
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ronmental group is that such cooperation is not anticompetitive, then the objec-
tion is really that such a conspiracy or combination is not "in restraint of trade."
The courts have construed that phrase broadly enough to encompass a union's
conspiracy with an environmental group when the union's purpose and effect is
to make interstate shipments by the employer more expensive, all to the benefit
of the employer's union shop competitors. 222 Of course, under current doctrine
the means of carrying out the conspiracy may offer protection to both the union
and the nonlabor group.
223
Two cases effectively illustrate the way in which a union may lose its sec-
tion 6 exemption by joining with nonlabor groups. They also contain important
parallels to the typical corporate campaign. First, in Harlem River Construction
Co-op v. Associated Grocers224 plaintiff, a cooperative grocery store, alleged that
union members ran a competing grocery store and that the union, its members,
and the competing store conspired to make plaintiff's store less profitable to
benefit the competing store.225 In denying the union's motion for a directed
verdict, the Harlem River court first noted that proof of a conspiracy is almost
always circumstantial. It found sufficient evidence from which a jury could con-
clude that various defendants had conspired as alleged. 226 After finding suffi-
cient evidence of a conspiracy between the union defendants and the nonunion
store, the court held that the union could not claim antitrust immunity under
section 6 of the Clayton Act.
227
The parallel between Harlem River and the UBC's corporate campaign
against Louisiana-Pacific derives from the UBC's relationship with Blandin
Wood Products.228 Blandin and Louisiana-Pacific were competitors in the nas-
cent waferboard market, and Blandin produced its waferboard product,
Blandex, with union labor.229 As the market share for Blandex increased, so did
the amount of work for the union and its members. 230 The UBC apparently
attempted to eliminate Louisiana-Pacific's waferboard product from as much of
the market as possible. Blandin cooperated by giving the union access to the
Blandin manufacturing facilities, by providing the union with factual informa-
222. Not long after Congress enacted the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), the Supreme Court
stated that the Act broadly condemns all combinations and conspiracies that restrain the free and
natural flow of trade in interstate commerce. See Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n. v.
United States, 234 U.S. 600, 609 (1914). In fact, the Sherman Act condemns restraints of trade
lawful at common law. See, eg., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 560 (1898);
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S. 290, 316 (1897); Wheeler-Stenzel Co. v.
National Window Glass Jobbers Ass'n., 152 F. 864, 868 (3d Cir. 1907).
223. See infra text accompanying notes 281-83.
224. 408 F. Supp. 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). For a cogent analysis of this case, see DiCola, supra
note 158, at 739-40.
225. See Harlem River, 408 F. Supp. at 1261-68 (detailing the facts of the case).
226. Id. at 1268-69.
227. Id. at 1269-70.
228. See supra text accompanying note 51.
229. See Blandex: A Union-Label Allternative to the Boycotted L-P Waferboard, CARPENTER,
Mar. 1985, at 10.
230. The union's other and more immediate motive was simply to put economic pressure on
Louisiana-Pacific. See supra text accompanying note 58.
[Vol. 65
CORPORATE CAMPAIGN
tion for the union's publicity, and by meeting with union representatives. 2 31
Although Blandin's role in the corporate campaign was small, and although
Blandin may not have been aware of the UBC's purpose in seeking its coopera-
tion, the Harlem River holding would indicate that the UBC lost its antitrust
immunity and exposed itself to a claim of per se liability when it enlisted the
help of a competitor of Louisiana-Pacific to reduce Louisiana-Pacific's market
share.
232
Second, the Supreme Court in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers233 denied a union's claim of antitrust immu-
nity because the union had used its boycott and strike powers to force local
contractors and others to use only locally manufactured electrical equipment.
Union members produced the locally manufactured equipment but not the out-
of-state equipment, and the union naturally wanted union manufacturers to have
all the local business. Plaintiffs, out-of-state manufacturers, sued the union, its
officials, and its members. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants, using coercion, had
extracted agreements from the local contractors not to purchase out-of-state
equipment. 234 The Supreme Court held that the union enjoyed no immunity
because the union entered into agreements with plaintiffs' business competitors.
The Court reasoned that a labor union violates the Sherman Act when, to fur-
ther its own interests, it aids and abets businesses to do that which the Sherman
Act prohibits.
235
The UBC's corporate campaign presented facts similar to those in Allen
Bradley. The UBC had extracted agreements from some retailers whereby the
retailers would not purchase Louisiana-Pacific's nonunion products and, in turn,
the unions would not conduct boycott activities of the retailers' establish-
ments. 236 The union obviously intended that only union made goods would be
sold at the retail outlets. Of course, that intent alone would not cause antitrust
problems. Antitrust violations would occur only if the unions entered into
agreements with retailers whereby the retailers would boycott Louisiana-Pacific
in exchange for the union's promise to cease its activities against the retailers.
Thus, a violation of section 8(e) of the NLRA also would entail a removal of the
Clayton Act section 6 exemption and would result in a per se violation of the
Sherman Act.237
231. See Blandex: A Union-Label Alternative to the Boycotted L-P Waferboard, CARPENTER,
Mar. 1985, at 10-11, 24.
232. In light of the Harlem River decision, Blandin could be a named defendant in an antitrust
action because it played a role as a coconspirator, depending on the degree of its participation and
awareness.
233. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
234. Id. at 798-800.
235. Id. at 809-10. The Supreme Court also stated that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits
injunctions of a union's secondary boycott activities if it acts alone. See id. at 812. The secondary
boycott aspects of Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), are discussed infra
notes 252-255 and accompanying text.
236. See supra text accompanying note 54.
237. See supra text accompanying note 214.
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3. Illegal Boycott Activities
An even stronger case for antitrust liability arises when a union engages in
successful secondary boycott activities. Section 6 of the Clayton Act exempts
only lawful acts; and even if the circularity problem of that term2 38 is avoided by
limiting criteria for unlawfulness to sources other than antitrust law, boycotts
prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(ii) of the NLRA also clearly lie outside the scope of
the section 6 exemptions.
239
Two early United States Supreme Court cases established the principle that
a union may violate the Sherman Act when it engages in secondary boycott
activities. In Lawlor v. Loewe24° the Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict
awarding money damages against a hatters union. The union had declared a
boycott of certain employers with whom it had a primary dispute. 24 1 However,
the hatters also declared a boycott of all dealers who bought goods from the
primary employer, and they circulated a list of "unfair dealers" who dealt with
the primary employer. 242 The Court held such secondary activities to be illegal
under the Sherman Act.
243
In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,244 which the Supreme Court de-
cided under the Clayton Act, plaintiff was a Michigan based manufacturer of
printing presses whose sales took place all over the United States. Defendants
were business agents of a union that represented 14 of plaintiff's 250 employees.
The union called a strike with predictably little effect given its limited penetra-
tion at the employer's plant. The union then sought to prevent the employer
from selling its presses by threatening purchasers, truckers, exhibitors, and in-
stallers with economic ruin if those parties refused to stop dealing with the em-
ployer.245 The Duplex Court recognized that, under certain circumstances, a
union is exempt from antitrust liability. However, the court found that the
union had departed from "its normal and legitimate objects,"'246 and it held that
238. See supra text accompanying note 202.
239. This conclusion holds true even under a "strict constructionist" view, which would define
illegality to mean that which was illegal at the time the Clayton Act was enacted. Total secondary
boycotts were illegal when the Clayton Act was enacted. See Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522, 534
(1914).
240. 235 U.S. 522 (1914).
241. Id. at 533.
242. Id. at 534.
243. The Court found that:
[lI]rrespective of compulsion or even agreement to observe its intimation, the circulation of
a list of "unfair dealers," manifestly intended to put the ban upon those whose names
appear therein, among an important body of [the primary employer's] possible customers
.. is within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act if it is intended to restrain and restrains
commerce among the States.
Id.
244. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
245. Id. at 462-63.
246. Id. at 469. This case provides a good example of the confusion ofmeans and ends discussed
supra text accompanying notes 199-200. The union was pursuing its normal and legitimate objects-
recognition by the employer and improved terms of employment. The illegality derived from the
means employed by the union.
[Vol. 65
1986] CORPORATE CAMPAIGN
neither section 6247 nor section 20248 of the Clayton Act exempts labor unions'
secondary boycott 249 activities from antitrust liability. Thus, the Court upheld
an injunction of the union's secondary activities.
2 50
Congress responded to the Duplex case by enacting the Norris-LaGuardia
Act in 1932.251 That Act overrules Duplex to the extent that Duplex allowed an
injunction for secondary boycott activities. 252 However, the Norris-LaGuardia
Act does not apply to damage actions like the action brought in Lawlor.253 For
that reason, Duplex and Lawlor still control any analysis of secondary boycott
damage actions under the Sherman and Clayton Acts.2 54 In addition, more re-
cent cases reinforce the basic holdings of those cases: A union loses its immu-
nity under the antitrust laws because it acts in restraint of trade if it intentionally
coerces third parties to cease business relations with the targeted or primary
employer.
255
247. Duplex, 254 U.S. at 469.
248. Id. at 473-77.
249. The Duplex Court provided an early definition of "secondary boycott:"
[That is, a combination not merely to refrain from dealing with complainant, or to advise
or by peaceful means persuade complainant's customers to refrain ("primary boycott") but
to exercise coercive pressure upon such customers, actual or prospective, in order to cause
them to withhold or withdraw patronage from complainant through fear of loss or damage
to themselves should they deal with it.
Id. at 466. Along similar lines, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Allen-
town Racquetball & Health Club v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 525 F. Supp. 156, 160 n.2
(E.D. Pa. 1981), observed that
[a] secondary boycott is the application of economic pressure upon a person with whom the
union has no dispute regarding its own terms of employment (neutral or secondary em-
ployer) in order to induce that person to cease doing business with another employer with
whom the union does have a dispute (primary employer).
Id.
250. Duplex, 254 U.S. at 478.
251. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 101-115 (1982)).
252. See Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 805-06.
253. See 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982); see also Republic Prods., Inc. v. American Fed'n of Musicians,
245 F. Supp. 475, 476-77 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (court lacking jurisdiction to issue injunction in a
labor dispute nevertheless has jurisdiction to award damages).
254. Commentators generally agree with this proposition. See Handler & Zifchak, supra note
158, at 470 n.60.
255. See, eg., Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 808-10 (union liable under antitrust laws for coercing
contractors into boycotting out-of-state electrical equipment manufacturers); Frito Lay, Inc. v. Re-
tail Clerks Local 7, 629 F.2d 653, 663 (10th Cir. 1980) (if union agreement is intended to have
secondary rather than primary objectives, the antitrust exemption is forfeited); Larry V. Muko, Inc.
v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 609 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (3d Cir. 1979) (coerced
agreements to boycott primary employers held to violate Sherman Act and destroy any exemption),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982); James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 499 F. Supp. 949, 959 (D. Del.
1980) (allegations that union coerced business into agreeing not to deal with plaintiff sufficient to
preclude dismissal of complaint); United States v. Olympia Provision & Baking Co., 282 F. Supp.
819, 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (union's attempts to enforce agreements with manufacturers that manu-
facturers would deal only with union shops held illegal), aff'd, 393 U.S. 480 (1969); Westlab, Inc. v.
Freedomland, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 701, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (motion to dismiss denied when com-
plaint alleged that union coerced business into breaking contract with plaintiff and refusing to deal
with plaintiff).
An important aspect of these cases is that courts generally do not require that all businesses
which agree to refuse to deal with the plaintiff be engaged in joint action among themselves. Rather,
the essential element is the agreement with the union that the business entity will refuse to deal with
the plaintiff. If the union secures agreements with a number of entities, each such agreement can be
an independent basis of liability. By analogy, in criminal law this principle is known as the "spoke
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Two relatively recent cases illustrate exactly how secondary boycott activi-
ties can result in antitrust as well as unfair labor practice liability, especially
when they occur in the context of a corporate campaign. In Larry V Muko, Inc.
v. Southwestern Pennsylvania Building & Construction Trades Council2 5 6 plain-
tiff, a nonunion construction contractor, sued a restaurant chain and two unions.
The complaint alleged an illegal agreement between defendants whereby the res-
taurant chain promised to use only union contractors in building new restau-
rants and, in turn, the union agreed to boycott plaintiff.2 57 At trial plaintiff
introduced evidence that the unions had engaged in picketing and leafleting of
the restaurant chain. 25 8 The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of the
unions, because it found no evidence of anything but a unilateral decision on the
part of the restaurant chain to use contractors other than plaintiff.259 In revers-
ing the trial court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
found evidence that the unions had coerced the restaurant chain into boycotting
plaintiff. The court held that the jury could have inferred a coerced, illegal
agreement between the restaurant chain and the union.260 The court held that
such a coerced boycott agreement violated the Sherman Act and further held
that none of the statutory or nonstatutory exemptions would apply, because the
jury could have found union cooperation with a nonunion group.261
Under these facts, as the jury could have perceived them, a coerced agree-
ment also could lead to liability under the NLRA. The jury could have found
both coercion designed to compel an agreement to boycott and an actual agree-
ment to boycott, resulting in liability under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and section
8(e) of that act.262 Similar findings may result in the context of a corporate
campaign such as the one described in this Article. 263
Another relatively recent case that carries implications relating to the cor-
porate campaign is United States v. Olympia Provision & Baking Co.264 In that
case the union had attempted to coerce frankfurter manufacturers into refusing
to deal with nonunion distributors. The court first termed it "elementary" that
boycotts and attempted boycotts are illegal. 265 The court then declared such
forced agreements to be illegal under the antitrust laws.266
Thus, because total secondary boycotts are illegal under the NLRA and
and wheel" as opposed to the "chain" conspiracy. See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
750, 754-55 (1946) (describing spoke and wheel conspiracy); United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921,
922 (2d Cir.) (describing chain conspiracy), rev'd on other grounds, 308 U.S. 287 (1939); L. WEIN-
REB, CRIMINAL LAW 589 (3d ed. 1980) (discussing difference between the two types of conspiracy).
256. 609 F.2d 1368 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982).
257. Id. at 1370-72.
258. Id. at 1371.
259. Id. at 1372.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1372-73.
262. For a discussion of these provisions of the NLRA, see supra notes 60-157 and accompany-
ing text.
263. See supra notes 16-59 and accompanying text.
264. 282 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).




under antitrust principles, the use of corporate campaign tactics may destroy the
union's exemption under section 6 of the Clayton Act. Also, because the union's
activities almost always result in a restraint of trade, the union almost inevitably
encounters antitrust liability under the Sherman Act.267 Furthermore, total sec-
ondary boycott activities are of the type that may invoke per se analysis, which
obviates a plaintiff's need to prove market effect.
2 6 8
4. Violence in the Corporate Campaign
As a practical matter, no union will publicly admit to the use of violence as
a tactic in a corporate campaign. In fact, national leadership generally cautions
locals against strike violence. 269 However, violence is nearly inevitable during a
protracted strike that involves large numbers of workers, especially when rheto-
ric is sharp and, as in the corporate campaign,2 70 when the union sets out to
attack the employer on a broad front. In such cases courts uniformly recognize
that if the union members agree, combine, or conspire to restrain trade in the
employer's goods by using violence, they lose their immunity and violate the
Sherman Act.271 This conclusion is inevitable given that the exemptions listed
under section 6 of the Clayton Act apply only to lawful acts.
272
Viewed from the standpoint of traditional antitrust theory, however, it
seems odd to subject workers to antitrust liability for essentially localized tor-
267. A variation on this "coerced boycott" theme is the "concerted refusal to deal" or "group
boycott," which gives rise to a per se violation of the antitrust laws. See United States v. General
Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146-47 (1966); Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806, 813-14 (6th Cir.),
cert denied, 393 U.S. 983 (1968). Typically, a concerted refusal to deal involves competitors of the
plaintiff who attempt to drive the plaintiff out of business. See, eg., Lewis, 400 F.2d at 813. In fact,
some cases suggest that the conspirators must be actual or potential competitors of the plaintiff. See,
e.g., West Tex. Utils. Co. v. Texas Elec. Serv. Co., 470 F. Supp. 798, 822 (N.D. Tex. 1979); KOS v.
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 676 P.2d 1069, 1076 (Alaska 1983). In the typical case, conspirators
agree among themselves not to deal with the victim and, as in Lewis, may enlist the aid of a union.
The corporate campaign involves an atypical form of a concerted refusal to deal. The union
acts as the organizer of the group and the others merely agree to go along. The retailers boycotting
the primary employer may be unaware of the concerted nature of their activity.
268. See, eg., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145-46 (1966); Lewis v.
Pennington, 400 F.2d 806, 813 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 983 (1968).
269. In its labor dispute with Louisiana-Pacific, the UBC leadership cautioned against violence
in its strike literature. See supra note 28. Such conduct helps the union create a paper trail so that it
may avoid liability for individual members' acts. A union or any member of a union cannot be liable
without "clear proof" that that union or member participated in, authorized, or ratified the act of
violence. See 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). Nonetheless, individual union members may be held liable for
any violence they actually commit. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 735-36
(1966).
270. Violence has erupted in the unions' strike against Louisiana-Pacific. See Daily J. Com.,
Jan. 11, 1984, at 3, col. 1 (describing violence). Although union officials generally eschew violence,
the head of Corporate Campaign, Inc., Ray Rogers, has been arrested for rioting during corporate
campaign activities. See Oregonian, Apr. 12, 1986, at Cl, col. 6.
271. See, e.g., Altemose Constr. Co. v. Atlantic Cape May & Parts, 493 F. Supp. 1181, 1190-91
(D.N.J. 1980) (vandalism, violence, and threats of violence destroy union's antitrust immunity under
§ 4 and § 20 of the Clayton Act); United States v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local 639, 32 F.
Supp. 594, 598-600 (D.D.C. 1940) (violence precludes union from Clayton Act exemption); Dean v.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 17 F. Supp. 748, 750 (W.D. La. 1936) (union's restraint of
trade by force and violence violates Sherman Act).
272. Availability of the exemption depends on whether the union is "lawfully carrying out"
legitimate union objectives. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tious activity. In 1939 the Supreme Court addressed that concern in Apex Ho-
siery Co. v. Leader.273 The union in that case had illegally seized plaintiff's
plant and prevented interstate shipments of plaintiff's goods.274 The Court held
that union violence whose only consequence is a restraint on interstate trade
does not necessarily contravene the antitrust laws.275 Rather the employer's
remedy in such cases is under state tort law.2 7 6 The purpose of the Sherman Act
is to protect free competition, not to police interstate commerce.277 To be ac-
tionable under the antitrust laws, the violence must "have or be intended to have
an effect upon prices in the market or otherwise to deprive the purchasers or
consumers of the advantages which they derive from free competition."
278
Thus, in accord with Apex Hosiery, sporadic and uncoordinated picket vio-
lence in the course of a corporate campaign would not result in a "combination
... or conspiracy.., in restraint of trade" 279 as that term of art contemplates.
Such violence may, however, constitute a combination and may in fact restrain
trade. But if a plaintiff employer can show that a union was using violence as a
tactic to put economic pressure on the employer by raising the cost of the em-
ployer's goods in order to make the employer less competitive than union-shop
competitors, such violence may give rise to a per se violation of the antitrust
laws.2
80
5. Protected Corporate Campaign Activities
Although certain aspects of the corporate campaign potentially violate fed-
eral antitrust law provisions, some elements would not result in antitrust liabil-
ity. For example, a thorough corporate campaign strategy includes opposition
to employer initiatives before governmental bodies. In the UBC corporate cam-
paign against Louisiana-Pacific, union tactics included seeking to block Louisi-
ana-Pacific's Urban Development Action Grant funding, opposing
environmental variances, opposing construction permits for Waferwood plants,
and opposing Louisiana-Pacific's access to federal timber.281 None of these ac-
tions provide a basis for antitrust liability. Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
a union or any other group may attempt to convince governmental bodies to
take action favorable to it.282 Because the doctrine is grounded in federal consti-
273. 310 U.S. 469 (1939). Apex Hosiery has received much attention from commentators. See,
e.g., Handler & Zifehak, supra note 158, at 479; Hoffmann, supra note 158, at 4-9; Winter, supra note
158, at 39-43.
274. Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 482-83.
275. Id. at 486-87, 489, 506, 512.
276, Id. at 512-13.
277. Id. at 500 (identifying the protection of competition as the Sherman Act's purpose).
278. Id. at 500-01.
279. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
280. See supra notes 269-72 and accompanying text. The Court in Apex Hosiery stated that a
union loses its exemption from the antitrust laws if the violence has or is intended to have a direct
market effect. See Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 501.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 30-34, 36.
282. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1965); Eastern R.R. Con-
ference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1961).
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tutional law principles rather than in antitrust doctrine,28 3 the scope of its pro-
tection properly extends to claims under the NLRA and state tort law as well.
V. LIABILITY UNDER STATE TORT LAW
An analysis of potential liability for corporate campaign activities under
state tort law differs from an analysis under federal labor and antitrust law.
Under labor and antitrust analyses individual tactics come under scrutiny. State
tort law analysis, however, requires an examination of the cumulative purpose
and effect of the campaign. In other words, analysis under state tort law re-
quires scrutiny of the campaign as a campaign. The synergistic effect of all the
corporate campaign activities, when combined with the motivation behind them,
may transcend the legality of any one act in isolation.
Under tort principles applicable in nearly every state, a person commits
tortious interference with another's business relations if that person intentionally
interferes with the other's business either in pursuit of an improper objective,
such as harming the other, or by use of improper means.28 4 Some states have
codified the tort.285 Either explicitly or implicitly, the doctrine requires that the
defendant not be privileged to interfere in the way it does.286 Three examples of
privileged conduct under federal labor law would include strikes,
28 7
283. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which is based on the right of petition protected by the Bill
of Rights, stands for the proposition that private citizens jointly have a right to petition governmen-
tal bodies for the enactment of policies. Eastern R.R. Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127, 138 (1961); see United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1965).
284. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Matin City Properties, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 3d 393, 406, 145 Cal. Rptr.
406, 413 (1978) (dictum); Rudoff v. Huntington Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 91 Misc. 2d 264, 265,
397 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864-65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Juhaz v. Quik Shops, Inc., 55 Ohio App. 2d 51, 55,
379 N.E.2d 235, 239 (1977); Straube v. Larson, 287 Or. 357, 360-61, 600 P.2d 371, 374 (1979); Top
Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 Or. 201, 209, 582 P.2d 1365, 1369 (1978); PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 130 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
285. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-499 (1982). The Virginia statute provides for both civil
and criminal penalties when two or more persons combine or conspire "for the purpose of willfully
and maliciously injuring another in his... business." Id. To recover under that statute, a "plaintiff
must prove (1) a combination.., for the purpose of willfully and maliciously injuring plaintiff in his
business and (2) resulting damage to plaintiff." Allen Realty Corp. v. Holbert, 227 Va. 441, 445, 318
S.E.2d 592, 596 (1984). That statute specifically exempts acts that are permitted by federal labor
law. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-499(c) (1982).
286. See, e.g., Bendix Corp. v. Adams, 610 P.2d 24, 29 (Alaska 1980) (persons privileged to
interfere in business relations to protect an investment); Worldwide Commerce, Inc. v. Fruehauf
Corp., 84 Cal. App. 3d 803, 808, 149 Cal. Rptr. 42, 45 (1978) (privileged conduct applies only to
certain socially accepted activities); Rudoff v. Huntington Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 91 Misc. 2d
264, 265, 397 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864-65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (persons generally privileged to interfere
"where such interference is made in protection of an equal or superior right").
287. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in [29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982)].
The Supreme Court has construed this section to authorize concerted work stoppages. See, e.g.,
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 385 n.20 (1969); Ameri-
can Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 308 (1965).
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picketing, 288 and the product boycott.28 9 Even in those states that do not ex-
plicitly recognize lack of privilege as an element of the interference with business
relations tort, those methods could not constitute tortious conduct due to federal
preemption doctrine.
290
The tort of intentional interference with business relations may encompass
the type of union tactics used in a typical corporate campaign. Besides more
traditional tactics, such as striking, picketing, handbilling, and product boycotts,
the union may engage in a number of hostile activities. The union may cooper-
ate with business competitors to damage the targeted employer economically, it
may increase pressures on secondary employers to cease doing business with the
employer, and individual union members may engage in acts of violence to in-
timidate the employer.291 Federal labor law would not sanction any of these
activities. 292 Furthermore, as part of a concerted campaign, they may expose
the union to liability under a state tortious interference with business theory.
The state tort of intentional interference offers the most obvious response to
the corporate campaign. It offers the prospect of punitive damages whereas un-
fair labor practice claims do not.293 Furthermore, an injured employer may
make the state tort claim pendent to an unfair labor practice and antitrust case
in federal court,294 and this strategy would have several advantages.
Such an avenue allows the employer to forum shop. When jurisdiction is
based on a federal labor or antitrust claim, the plaintiff may sue where its princi-
288. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) also has been construed to permit picketing activity on the premises
of the primary employer. See, eg., Exparte George, 371 U.S. 72, 73 (1962); NLRB v. Visceglia, 498
F.2d 43, 47-48 (3d Cir. 1974). Significantly, boycott activities instituted for an unlawful purpose are
not protected by 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). See, eg., Hoover Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 380, 386 (6th Cir.
1951); Adams Dairy, Inc. v. Burke, 293 S.W.2d 281, 292-93 (Mo. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 969
(1957).
289. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 60, 71-73 (1964) (holding product boy-
cott permissible under federal labor law).
290. Federal labor law preempts a tortious interference claim if what is being claimed would also
constitute an unfair labor practice. See United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 693-94
(1963). This does not mean, however, that federal labor law has "occupied the field" when it comes
to union conduct. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 729 (1966) (states may regulate
union violence). More importantly, that which Congress declares legal, a state may not declare
illegal. See U.S. CONST., art VI.
291. At one time or another, the unions' corporate campaign against Louisiana-Pacific involved
all of these activities. For a description of that particular campaign, see supra notes 16-59 and
accompanying text.
292. For a discussion of legal consequences under the NLRA that arise from the exertion of
secondary pressures, see supra notes 77-145 and accompanying text. For a discussion of legal conse-
quences under the antitrust laws that arise from illegal combinations in restraint of trade, see supra
notes 209-37 and accompanying text. For a discussion of legal consequences that arise when a union
engages in violence, see supra notes 269-80 and accompanying text.
293. The federal courts have long held that plaintiffs may not recover punitive damages when
they assert an unfair labor practice case under 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982). See, eg., Teamsters Union v.
Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 259-61 (1964); United Mine Workers v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742, 749-50 (4th
Cir. 1954). If, however, the recovery is under a state tort theory, punitive damages may be available.
See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 720-21 (1966) (state tort law giving punitive
damages not preempted by conflicting federal law); Price v. United Mine Workers, 336 F.2d 771,
775 (6th Cir. 1964) (punitive damages may be awarded under state tort law for violations of NLRA's
boycott provisions), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1964).
294. For example, a tort claim is included in what is primarily an antitrust complaint against a
union. See, e.g., James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 499 F. Supp. 949, 959 (D. Del. 1980).
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pal office is located or where any agent or officer has represented union mem-
bers.2 95 Thus, a large national union may be pursued with a pendent tort claim
nearly anywhere in the United States. If a plaintiff brings the tort claim sepa-
rately, however, diversity of citizenship must be the basis of jurisdiction.2 96 Be-
cause a union is a citizen, for diversity purposes, of every state where it has
members,297 and because a national union is likely to have members in the em-
ployer's state of citizenship, complete diversity is difficult to achieve.
By forum shopping, an employer also can select the applicable substantive
tort law. A federal court will apply the forum state's substantive law,2 98 includ-
ing its conflict of laws principles. 299 An employer therefore can look for a state
that calls for application of its own tort law, even for torts committed out of
state, and that also has tort principles advantageous to the employer.
By bringing claims under all three theories-labor, antitrust, and state tort
law-at once, the employer may avoid compulsory joinder problems. If the em-
ployer brings only a state tort claim, or only a federal antitrust claim, or only an
unfair labor practice claim, or any combination thereof, and the omitted claims
are factually related enough to the claims brought, principles of res judicata may
bar the employer from asserting any omitted claims thereafter. 30°
VI. CONCLUSION
As the climate for labor unions has become less hospitable, many unions
have become more aggressive in their tactics. The most recent manifestation of
increased labor aggressiveness is the corporate campaign, a centrally coordi-
nated, broad-stroke assault on the employer. As typically structured, the corpo-
rate campaign opens the union to potential liability under federal labor law,
federal antitrust law, and state tort law.
Certain aspects of the corporate campaign, however, receive the protection
of federal statutory or constitutional law. For example, the union's right to peti-
tion the government with alleged employer violations of federal law and the
union's right to engage in more traditional tactics, such as the use of handbills,
pickets, and product boycotts to target the primary employer, are protected.
Also, less egregious aspects of the campaign, such as the use of media publicity
directed against the primary employer and the union members' rights to publi-
cize its dispute at shareholders' meetings, are examples of protected conduct.
295. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(c) (1982).
296. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982) grants diversity jurisdiction.
297. See United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 149-53 (1965).
298. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
299. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
300. See, e.g., 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4407 (1981); Blume, Required Joinder of Claims, 45 MICH. L. REV. 797, 801-03 (1947). A plaintiff
may be barred even though theoretically joinder of claims is always permissive rather than compul-
sory in federal courts. See FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a). The commonality of facts that must be present for
res judicata principles to apply must be no more broad than the "common nucleus of operative fact"
required for pendent jurisdiction purposes. Otherwise, principles of res judicata could force a plain-
tiff to bring claims for which the court would have no subject matter jurisdiction. See C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, Supra, § 4407, at 54-56, 62.
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Nevertheless, as this Article has demonstrated, the more hostile and egregious
aspects of the campaign, taken together, represent a novel and illegal union as-
sault against the primary employer. Employers, unions, and the courts must be
sensitive to the illegality inherent in an aggresive corporate campaign.
